关 键 词 :制造商竞争;闭环供应链;回收合作;非合作-合作两型博弈学科分类:经济学--金融学
本文针对由两个价格竞争的制造商和一个资金约束的回收商组成的闭环供应链,考虑制造商可以以成本分担或任务分担的方式与回收商开展回收合作,基于非合作-合作两型博弈方法,研究闭环供应链中竞争与合作共存时最优回收合作策略的选择问题。首先,在非合作博弈部分,两个制造商独立制定分担策略和产品销售价格,形成竞争局势。其次,在合作博弈部分,制造商与回收商进行分担比例和回收率的选择,利用Shapley值分配利润,得到的支付函数。然后,参与主体将分配得到的利润作为非合作博弈部分的支付函数,求解得到最优产品销售价格、最优回收率和最优利润等。再求解双矩阵博弈的纳什均衡得到制造商分担策略均衡。最后,利用数值仿真分析制造商不同回收合作策略对回收商利润水平的影响以及回收商的偏好。
With the increasingly serious problems of resource waste and environmental pollution, promoting sustainable development has become a common goal of governments, enterprises and social organizations. In this context, Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC), as one of the key strategies to achieve this goal, has been paid attention to by all circles, and the research on CLSC in the academic world has been developed considerably. The academic research on CLSC has also made great development. However, there are still some problems in the development of CLSC, such as the double marginalization effect due to the fact that the chain members only consider maximizing their own interests, the low motivation of recycling due to the financial constraints faced by the recycling body, and the lack of in-depth research on the complex closed-loop supply chain where competition exists, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to actively explore the management model. Therefore, it is necessary to actively explore the optimization of the management mode, strengthen the synergy of all stakeholders, improve the efficiency of resource recycling and reuse, promote the closed-loop supply chain to better adapt to the contemporary economic environment, and give full play to its role in sustainable development.
In this paper, for the closed-loop supply chain composed of two price-competitive manufacturers and one capital-constrained recycler, consider that the manufacturer can carry out Cooperation Recovery with the recycler in the form of cost sharing and responsibility sharing, and use the Noncooperative-cooperative Biform Game method to study the optimal cooperative recovery strategy selection problem of the closed-loop supply chain with the coexistence of competition and cooperation. First, in the non-cooperative part, the two manufacturers independently set sharing strategies and product selling prices to form a competitive situation. Secondly, in the cooperative part, the manufacturer and the recycler choose different sharing ratios and recovery rates, establish a cooperative game for the closed-loop supply chain to portray the competition between manufacturers and the cooperation between manufacturers and recyclers, and allocate the profits using the Shapley value to obtain the payment function. Then, the participating subjects use the allocated profits as the payment function of the non-cooperative part, and solve to get the optimal product sales price, optimal recovery rate and optimal profits. Then, the Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game is solved to obtain the manufacturer sharing strategy equilibrium. Finally, numerical simulation is used to analyze the impact of different cooperation recovery strategies of manufacturers on the profit level of recyclers and the preference of recyclers.