2008年金融危机与2022年俄乌冲突之后，欧洲极右翼政党迅速崛起，深刻改变了欧盟及各成员国的政治生态。一个值得关注的现象是：无论执政的瑞士人民党、匈牙利青民盟，还是在野的德国选择党、法国国民联盟，均表现出对职业教育的高度偏好，同时对高等教育持批评态度。本文从阶级视角出发，将极右翼的社会基础界定为对现状不满的大资产阶级、处于地位下滑焦虑中的小资产阶级以及部分被动员的工人阶级，进而从意识形态、选民基础与资产阶级利益三个层面，解释其对职业教育的结构性偏好。在意识形态层面，对职业教育的推崇与极右翼的民粹主义、主权主义、社会保守主义、生产者主义及优绩主义高度相关；职业教育中人文社科训练的先天薄弱，亦使其成为传播右翼意识形态、挑战建制派文化霸权、巩固“再工业化”议题所有权的理想场域。在选民层面，2008年以来的贫富分化、去工业化与能源危机导致传统制造业地区持续衰落，大量工人与小企业主成为激进右翼的潜在支持者；他们大多依赖职业教育维持社会地位，扩张职业教育因此具有精准的选举动员功能。在资产阶级利益层面，面对竞争力持续下滑，部分资产阶级对现行政策与建制派政党日益不满，转向支持极右翼，以扩大劳动力供给、压低工资成本，并借助其意识形态转移工人的不满情绪；在德国与法国，极右翼正在努力获得大资产阶级的青睐。在瑞士与匈牙利，大资产阶级更已构成执政党维系统治的关键支柱。本文综合运用政党政治中的需求—供给理论与议题所有权理论，结合马克思主义阶级分析方法，比较德国、法国、瑞士、匈牙利四国激进右翼政党的教育政策，探究其偏好职业教育的结构性动因，并对其政治影响作出初步判断。

After the 2008 financial crisis and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine conflict, European far-right parties rose rapidly, profoundly transforming the political ecology of the EU and its member states. One noteworthy phenomenon is that whether governing parties such as the Swiss People's Party and Hungary's Fidesz, or opposition parties such as Germany's Alternative for Germany and France's National Rally, all demonstrate a strong preference for vocational education while adopting a critical stance toward higher education. From a class perspective, this paper defines the social base of the far right as consisting of the big bourgeoisie dissatisfied with the status quo, the petty bourgeoisie experiencing status-anxiety, and a portion of the mobilized working class. It then explains their structural preference for vocational education from three dimensions: ideology, electoral base, and bourgeois interests. At the ideological level, the valorization of vocational education is closely related to the far right's populism, sovereigntism, social conservatism, productivism, and meritocracy; the inherent weakness of humanities and social science training in vocational education also makes it an ideal field for disseminating right-wing ideology, challenging the cultural hegemony of the establishment, and consolidating ownership of the "reindustrialization" issue. At the electoral level, the wealth polarization, deindustrialization, and energy crisis since 2008 have led to the continuous decline of traditional manufacturing regions, with large numbers of workers and small business owners becoming potential supporters of the radical right; most of them rely on vocational education to maintain their social status, so expanding vocational education thus serves a precise electoral mobilization function. At the level of bourgeois interests, facing persistently declining competitiveness, a portion of the bourgeoisie has grown increasingly dissatisfied with existing policies and establishment parties, turning to support the far right in order to expand labor supply, suppress wage costs, and use its ideology to divert workers' discontent; in Germany and France, the far right is striving to win the favor of the big bourgeoisie. In Switzerland and Hungary, the big bourgeoisie has already become a key pillar for the ruling party to maintain its rule. This paper comprehensively employs the demand-supply theory and issue ownership theory in party politics, combined with Marxist class analysis, to compare the education policies of radical right parties in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Hungary, explore the structural motivations behind their preference for vocational education, and make a preliminary assessment of its political implications.