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新型回收技术驱动下政府、回收企业、环保组织演化博弈分析——以电池回收行业为例 作者:刘榕震

关 键 词 :技术升级;回收行业;环保组织;演化博弈;仿真分析学科分类:管理学--管理学其他学科

摘要/Abstract

为了多方推动回收企业采用新型回收技术以减少环境污染,本文构建政府、回收企业、环保组织三方演化博弈模型,分析演化稳定策略和实现条件,以电池回收行业为例,运用MATLAB R2021a进行数值仿真分析。研究发现:(1)该三方演化博弈模型共有三种稳定策略,其中{间接监管、新型技术、监督}是最符合实际的理想策略。(2)政府对环保组织的补贴正向影响环保组织策略演化。(3)政府对采用传统技术的回收企业的罚款正向影响政府策略选择。(4)政府对回收企业罚款和环保组织监督时企业额外承受的损失在一定范围内可以有效促进回收企业采取新型技术。罚款和额外损失过大时,企业会倾向于选择传统技术。


In order to promote recycling enterprises to adopt new recycling technologies to reduce environmental pollution, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government, recycling enterprises and environmental protection organizations to analyze the evolutionary stability strategy and realization conditions. Taking battery recycling industry as an example, MATLAB R2021a is used for numerical simulation analysis. The results show that: (1) there are three stable strategies in the tripartite evolutionary game model, among which {indirect regulation, new technology, supervision} is the most realistic ideal strategy. (2) Government subsidies to environmental organizations have a positive impact on the strategy evolution of environmental organizations. (3) The penalty imposed by the government on recycling enterprises using traditional technologies has a positive impact on the government's choice of strategies. (4) The additional losses suffered by enterprises when the government imposes fines on recycling enterprises and environmental organizations supervise them can effectively promote recycling enterprises to adopt new technologies to a certain extent. When fines and additional losses are too great, companies tend to adopt traditional technology.

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论文刊载证明

新型回收技术驱动下政府、回收企业、环保组织演化博弈分析——以电池回收行业为例 于 2023-06-06 在中国高校人文社会科学信息网(互联网出版许可证:(总)网出证(京)字第052号)刊载,对外公开发表。论文作者为:刘榕震 。特此证明。

  

刊载地址:https://www.sinoss.net/c/2023-06-06/633359.shtml

中国人民大学出版社

中国高校人文社会科学信息网

2023-06-06