地方政府隐形债务在“四万亿”投资计划后快速增长，会通过挤占企业长期债务资金，影响企业投资决策，最终影响企业期权价值，研究该隐形债务最终实现。本文采用2003-2020年所有上市公司数据探讨地方政府债务对企业投资效率与期权价值的影响，研究表明：（1）地方政府隐形债务降低企业投资效率；（2）中介效应模型显示企业的债务融资能力和长期债务占比是地方政府隐形债务降低企业投资效率的中介变量，（3）在此基础上使用zhang（2000）提出的实物期权模型研究表明地方政府隐形债务降低了中等盈利能力和高盈利能力公司的增长期权价值，增加了低盈利能力公司的清算期权价值。（4）分组回归结果显示地方政府隐形债务降低了国有企业的清算期权价值，降低了民营企业的增长期权价值，这一结果表明地方政府隐形债务降低国有企业和民营企业的投资效率的着力点不同。

The rapid growth of the hidden debt of local governments after the "4 trillion" investment plan will affect the investment decisions of enterprises by crowding out the long-term debt funds, and ultimately affect the option value of enterprises. The final realization of this hidden debt is studied. This paper uses the data of all listed companies from 2003 to 2020 to explore the impact of local government debt on enterprise investment efficiency and option value. The research shows that: (1) Hidden local government debt reduces enterprise investment efficiency; (2) The intermediary effect model shows that the debt financing capacity of enterprises and the proportion of long-term debt are the intermediary variables for the hidden debt of local government to reduce the investment efficiency of enterprises. (3) On this basis, using the real option model proposed by zhang (2000), the research shows that the hidden debt of local government reduces the growth option value of companies with medium and high profitability. It increases the value of liquidation options for companies with low profitability. (4) Grouping regression results show that local government invisible debt reduces the liquidation option value of state-owned enterprises and the growth option value of private enterprises. This result indicates that local government invisible debt has different emphasis on reducing the investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.