随着并购业务日趋频繁，为缓解信息不对称而签订的业绩承诺应运而生，并购双方签订业绩承诺协议的初衷是督促被并购企业积极完成业绩，保障并购方的利益。然而，随着业绩承诺兑现集中到期，业绩违约事件在资本市场上频频爆发，给上市公司股价崩盘和金融市场带来了风险。本文基于委托代理理论、信息不对称理论、信号传递理论和激励理论，研究了企业签订业绩承诺对研发投入的影响，本文的研究结论进一步丰富了对现有业绩承诺制度的认识,有利于发现该项制度在运行中所出现的各类问题,并在此基础上提出完善并购监管的政策措施。 

With the increasing frequency of M&A business, performance commitments signed to alleviate information asymmetry have come into being. The initial purpose of performance commitment agreements between M&A parties is to urge the acquired companies to actively complete their performance and to protect the interests of both parties to M&A. However, with the concentrated expiration of performance commitment fulfillment, performance defaults frequently break out in the capital market, bringing risks to the stock price collapse of listed companies and financial markets. Based on principal-agent theory, information asymmetry theory, signaling theory and incentive theory, this paper investigates the impact of firms' signing performance commitments on R&D investment. The findings of this paper further enrich the understanding of the existing performance commitment system, facilitate the identification of various problems arising from the operation of this system, and propose policy measures to improve M&A regulation on this basis.