

# AMERICA'S LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA

BY: AMBASSADOR JULIA CHANG BLOCH

(Institute for Global Chinese Affairs, College Park, University of Maryland, U.S.)

**Summary:** The US-China relationship has been turbulent from the start, locked into love-hate cycles beset by crises. Factors contributing to these cycles have been the two countries' vastly different histories, cultures and national experiences, which have produced gaps in perception, miscalculations and unrealistic expectations by both sides.

Using the cycles of love and hate as a framework, the paper examines the more than two-hundred years of interaction between the two countries: 1784-1840: Respect; 1840-1900: Contempt; 1900-1949: Benevolence; 1949-1972: Hostility; 1972-1989: Benevolence and Admiration Again; 1989-2000: Turbulence Continues

Since September 11, the US-China relationship has improved significantly, a development that may be unsurpassed by previous periods in its history. Although current cooperation has created a new age of respect, the underlying tensions between the two countries, including the Taiwan question, remain unchanged.

The United States and China are currently in a position to break the love-hate cycles that have characterized the relationship. Increasing face-time between the heads of state, as well as more dialogue and interaction at all levels of society may in time narrow the cultural gap and dispel misperceptions and myths that each country has concocted about the other. Over time, this may prevent the love-hate cycles from resuming their repetitive and destructive swings, and a stable, productive relationship can ensue.

**Keywords:** Love-hate relationship, Perception gap, Bush administration, U.S.-China Relations.

中图分类号: D8 文献标识码: A

## Introduction

Relations between China and the United States have fluctuated wildly particularly in the past fifty years. Such divisive issues as proliferation, human rights, and Taiwan have fueled

删除的内容:

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 小四

删除的内容:

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 小四

删除的内容:

带格式的: 右 0.5 字符, 段落间距段后: 0.5 行, 行距: 固定值 15 磅

删除的内容: POLICY  
IMPLICATIONS AND CHOICES

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

删除的内容: (FIGURE OUT LATER)

删除的内容: POLICY  
IMPLICATIONS AND CHOICES

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号, 非加粗

带格式的: ... [1]

删除的内容:

带格式的: ... [2]

删除的内容:

带格式的: ... [3]

带格式的: 左, 右 0.5 字符

带格式的: 右 0.5 字符

删除的内容:

带格式的: ... [4]

带格式的: ... [5]

带格式的: ... [6]

带格式的: ... [7]

删除的内容: ... [8]

带格式的: ... [9]

删除的内容: Summar ... [10]

带格式的: ... [11]

删除的内容: ... [12]

带格式的: ... [13]

删除的内容: ... [14]

带格式的: ... [15]

删除的内容:

带格式的: ... [16]

intense debate over how the United States should deal with the rising power that is China today.

These fluctuations in US-China relations began well before China became communist and continues today. Looking back over more than 200 years of American contact with China – since the American ship *Empress of China* first called at Canton in 1784 – what has made this relationship so precarious and explosive is that it is characterized by an equal measure of love and hate on the part of both countries.

In his 1950s classic *Scratches on our Minds*, Harold R. Isaacs<sup>1</sup> explained that Americans hold a series of dichotomous “love/hate” images of China and the Chinese, which has led the US to alternatively romanticize and demonize China. Isaacs argued that these images in turn have evolved emotions about the Chinese that have veered between “sympathy and rejection, parental benevolence and parental exasperation, affection and hostility, love and a fear close to hate.”

Isaacs categorized American views of China into six eras: Respect – 18<sup>th</sup> century; Contempt – 1840-1905; Benevolence – 1905-1937; Admiration – 1937-1944; Disenchantment – 1944-1949; and Hostility – 1949-<sup>2</sup>

Steven Mosher in *China Perceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality* took up where Isaacs left off, extending the Age of Hostility from 1949 to 1972, adding three new cycles: the Second Age of Admiration – 1972-1977; the Second Age of Disenchantment – 1977-1980; and the Second Age of Benevolence – 1980-1989.<sup>3</sup>

Not much has been written in English about how the Chinese view Americans, but Arkush and Lee in their *Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present*, looked at the love-hate cycles from the perspective of the Chinese. They identified four periods that reflect Chinese perceptions of the US: exotic wonderment and fear – 1841-1900; admiration of the American model, along with criticism of flaws in its values – 1900-1950; anti-Americanism in mainland China, and friendly familiarity in Taiwan – 1950-1971; and rediscovery and respect – 1971-1989.<sup>4</sup>

While American perceptions of China have fluctuated between extremes of fascination and contempt, the Chinese have reciprocated with views of America shifting between admiration and resentment.

These cycles of love and hate are more understandable when considered in the context of the differences in national experience and the gaps in perception that have plagued China and the US since their first contact when the *Empress of China* docked at Canton in 1784.

带格式的

删除的内容: in

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

### Differences in National Experience

As the United States rose from post-colonial status to become one of the world's great powers, China was in decline. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States pursued an aggressive policy of expansionism, extending its political and economic influence around the world.

During the same time period, on the other hand, China saw the collapse of its dynastic order and imperial system and the imposition of foreign extraterritorial and colonial rights on its soil. From the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, China experienced some 100 years of foreign occupation and invasion, bloody insurrections, a cataclysmic civil war, violent ideological struggles and revolutionary upheaval, threats of nuclear attack, and, worst from its view, the unresolved loss of national sovereignty in the form of Taiwan's continued de facto political separation from the mainland.

It has only been relatively recently – just 25 years ago with Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms – that China finally emerged from more than a century of dislocation, internal division, and chaos, and set itself firmly on a pragmatic path of national development. At the same time, the United States had become the world's sole superpower.

The different trajectories and national experience that have shaped both countries since their first contact left each country with a different world view and a legacy of mutual resentments and disappointments, as well as misplaced hopes and expectations.

### Gaps in Perception

The history of western imperialism in China, moreover, has been a source of anger and bitterness, which reflexively has permeated Chinese perceptions of the West. Just as current anti-China sentiments in the US are largely colored by images left over from the ideological prism of the Cold War; so, Chinese perceptions of the US, even today, are influenced by the history of a century of Western domination and humiliation.

The perceptual dissonance between the US and China can be likened to a psychological Rorschach test, we don't see things as they are; we see them as we are. In particular, the US has yet to see China for what it is, rather than the extension of themselves that

Americans imagine China to be. In looking at China – its people, history, culture and society – Americans have generally seen China as we are, not as it really is – because the leit motiv of US interaction with China from first contact to today has been to change the Chinese in their image.

删除的内容: our

带格式的

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

While the American public generally knows or cares little about China, and it can be said that Americans rarely have a single view of anything; still, Americans have always been possessed of the moral certitude that America's most cherished values – freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, free markets, and free trade – are universal values, and that everyone wants to be like them. They point to the legions of immigrants who risk life and limb to gain entry to the US by whatever means; to the unending stream of foreign students, Chinese in particular, who vie for visas to study in US universities and, once there, refuse to leave.

While Americans perceive their historic mission in China – to spread the faith, convert the heathens, and implant democracy and capitalism – as benign, the Chinese do not. The Chinese are not alone in their dislike of America's self-proclaimed mission to "Americanize" the world. Therein lies the gap in perceptions that has bedeviled US-China relations from the beginning. How American and Chinese perceptions differ can be seen in the following:

- Americans perceived the missionary movement in China as a philanthropic and humanitarian undertaking that helped China, particularly in the educational and medical fields. Chinese, on the other hand, point to the paternalism of missionaries, who were in China to carry the "white man's burden" in "civilizing" their little brown brethren.
- Americans often deny their imperial past, pointing with self satisfaction to not taking "treaty ports" in China. History, however, remembers that Washington, like other western powers, took every advantage of the privileges conferred by extraterritoriality and did not relinquish them until 1943.
- For Americans and westerners, the Boxer Rebellion will always be associated with the 55-day siege of the Legation Compound in Peking and the subsequent punitive expeditions, and the allied occupation. For the Chinese, the ruins of the Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan), looted and razed by allied troops, remain a stark symbol of China's humiliation and impotence to expel foreign imperialists.
- Americans history texts point with pride to the (John) Hay Open Door Policy, which proposed that China should not become the sphere of influence of any single nation or small group of nations, but that China should remain open to trade and other relations to all nations,<sup>5</sup> as an anti-imperialist and a selfless US effort to protect China's territorial integrity.

But the Chinese see, also, that the Americans were less interested in Chinese rights than in protecting their own commercial access to China.

■ \_\_\_\_\_ Americans are proud of their image as supporters of China in its times of need and a defender of its interests when others threatened, as during World War II. Many even presumed themselves benefactors of China. When the communists won the civil war, and Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists fled to Taiwan, the Chinese called it liberation, and the Americans felt betrayed.

← - - - 带格式的: 项目符号和编号

These gaps in perception are culture bound. Left unattended, they distort motives and insinuate mistrust, leading to miscalculations and conflict. They are at the heart of the cyclical swings in US-China relations.

### Cycles of Love and Hate

The Isaacs, Mosher and Arkush and Lee categorizations of the cycles provide a framework to better understand the volatility in US-China relations. They should not be applied universally, as there were bound to have been Americans who had held the Chinese in contempt during the era of respect, or in admiration during the era of contempt.

#### 1784-1840 (Respect)

One hundred years before the *Empress of China* docked at Canton, Europe was enjoying a craze for *Chinoiserie* – from tea, to silks, to porcelain, to Chinese pavilions in the gardens of the rich and famous.

During the eighteenth century, the west admired China's ancient history, its renown as the inventor of the compass, paper-making, gunpowder and printing. The Chinese were seen as a superior people, boasting riches and exotica coveted by European and American society. The market in Europe and America for tea, a new drink in the West, expanded greatly. Additionally, there was a continuing demand for Chinese silk and porcelain, but China wanted little that the West had to offer.

When their attempts to trade with China were rebuffed, "gunboat diplomacy" took by force what they could not gain by diplomacy. Thus began China's 150 years of humiliation, ending the "Age of Respect" and beginning the "Age of Contempt."

### **1840-1900 (Contempt)**

Between the first major confrontation, the Opium War of 1839-42 and the early 1900s, the Russians, British, French, Germans, Americans, and Japanese competed for "*spheres of influence*" within China until China was described as being "carved up like a melon." Defeated in a series of military disasters, China was forced to sign unequal treaties that opened treaty ports to first European, and then American and Japanese merchants, soldiers, and Christian missionaries, who followed trade and the flag.

Russia took the first slice – all of Manchuria north of the Heilongjiang and east of the Ussuri River. Foreign encroachments increased after 1860, and foreign settlements in the treaty ports became extra-territorial – beyond Chinese law. During this same period, Taiwan was ceded to Japan, and Hong Kong to Britain.

The Qing Dynasty's defeat, decline and decay further painted the image of the Chinese, according to Isaacs, as "the inferior people, victims and subjects, sources of profit, objects of scorn and pity, and ultimately, by the Americans, as wards."<sup>6</sup> Following the rude realities of the Opium War, the unequal treaties, and loss of sovereignty, China fell into chaos, ravaged by the savage uprising in 1900 of the fiercely nationalistic Boxers, whose rallying cry was "Revive the Qing, destroy the Foreign."<sup>7</sup>

### **1900-1949 (Benevolence and Admiration)**

The Boxer rebellion was a turning point in Chinese history. Foreign domination of China reached new heights after the 8-power allied invasion. The Boxer Protocol of 1901 exacted a heavy indemnity of \$333 million with interest, a sum that exceeded the government's annual income.<sup>8</sup> The Qing dynasty, unable to recover its authority, was overthrown in the republican revolution of 1911.

Americans saw in the 1911 revolution images of 1776 and, thus, began in earnest the evolution of American paternalism toward China and its quest to remake China in America's image. Missionaries, politicians and diplomats sought to make the world safe for democracy by turning China, the world's most populous nation, into a democratic capitalist society on the firm conviction that what is good for America is good for China and the world.

In the ruling families of Republican China, Americans believed they had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. Sun Yat-Sen, the founder of the Chinese republic, emigrated to Hawaii at age 13, was educated in missionary schools, graduated from Oahu College, and became Christian. He married Soong Qingling of the ubiquitous Soong family, also Christian, who graduated from Wesleyan College for Women in Macon, Georgia. Her elder sister

Soong Ailing also was a Wesleyan alumna and married H.H. Kung, who earned a B.A. at Oberlin College and a master's degree in economics at Yale University. Their younger sister Song Meiling, a Wellesley graduate, would marry Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Nationalist government (Kuomingdang), and later convert him to Christianity. Three of the Soong brothers – two educated at Harvard and one at Vanderbilt – returned to China and along with Kung would take up business and serve the Nationalist government as finance ministers

US partisanship toward the Nationalists in China's civil war was predictable in this context. Unlike the communists, the nationalist regime was headed by a Christian Methodist couple, staffed largely by graduates of mission schools and American universities, who spoke English, moved easily in American social circles, and seemingly shared American values.

The formidable media empire of Henry Luce – *Time*, *Life*, *Fortune*, radio broadcasts on "March of Time," and Time Newsreels shown in theaters throughout the US – touted the Nationalists, shaping a prevalent American view of China as a friendly, democratic, and increasingly Christian state in many ways like the US, and swayed a generation of American opinion against Mao Tse Tung and the Chinese communists in favor of the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek. Events in China, however, did not conform to the visions propagated by Luce's media machine. Wishful thinking about China resulted in a wholly unrealistic view of the quality and effectiveness of the Chiang Kai-shek government, raising expectations that could not possibly be met.

The victory of the Chinese communists in 1949 was a shocking and bewildering experience for many Americans, who had sought to save China by transforming it in their image. The resulting sense of disillusionment and disappointment was all the greater because of the very depth of earlier beliefs, contributing to the fervent anti-communism of the era and the relentless hunt for those responsible for "losing China."

This notion of the Chinese as aspiring Americans in their struggle for democracy and freedom derived less from the reality of Chinese historical or cultural similarities than from a projection of American values and culture, fostered by various political, economic, and religious interests.

### **1949-1972 (Hostility)**

After the civil war on the Chinese mainland ended in 1949, the worst period in US-China relations began. For more than two decades the United States tried to "contain" China,

cutting off contact, blocking Beijing's admission into the United Nations and enforcing a trade embargo. In the 1950s, the uproar over "who lost China" helped unleash McCarthyism and its witch hunts. And in the 1960s, the fear of the spread of Chinese-style Communism in Southeast Asia – the so-called domino theory – led the US into Vietnam and a war that nearly tore America apart. In the intervening years, China and the US went to war over Korea (1950-1953) and nearly came to blows over the Quemoy-Matsu Crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, when the Eisenhower administration threatened nuclear strikes – yes, nuclear – against Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Throughout this period, Washington held fast to the belief that the Chinese Communist regime was only a temporary aberration.

### **1972-1989 (*Benevolence and Admiration Again*)**

**Richard Nixon:** When President Nixon arrived in Beijing in February 1972, a new era of US-China relations opened. It was the first major diplomatic event of the global telecommunications age – the first event since the development of satellites broadcasted live around the world. Television coverage fired the imagination of millions of Americans and turned this visit into a powerful collective spectacle that would shape how a whole generation of Americans would see China.

Through their small black and white television screens, millions of Americans experienced a part of Nixon's triumphant journey to China, vicariously participating in China's transformation – again in the words of Isaacs, from "diabolic, crude, ugly, inhuman, threatening Chinese" to "clever, charming, coping, attractive, hardworking Chinese."<sup>9</sup> Almost overnight, Americans revived their love affair with China and all things Chinese – Chinese food, Chinese art, Chinese fashions suddenly became chic.

Given the history of US-China relations, it was inevitable that such high expectations would run the risk of bitter disappointment because what had changed was not China, but American perceptions of China. Americans at the time had no idea that China was in the throes of the Cultural Revolution, one of the darkest periods in its history.

Consider the most tangible result of Nixon's visit – the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, which has framed relations between Washington and Beijing ever since – and its wording on Taiwan that broke the impasse on Nixon's diplomatic breakthrough with China.



"The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."<sup>10</sup>

This was diplomatic language at its cleverest, but it did not resolve the Taiwan question, which would dog successive administrations and remain to this day as the most sensitive issue affecting US-China relations.

**Jimmy Carter:** Because the US-China rapprochement was based on opposition to a common enemy – the Soviet Union – rather than a shared world view, formal diplomatic relations between the US and China would not be reestablished until 1979, under President Jimmy Carter. In reaction, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, going much further than the Carter Administration had intended in protecting Taiwan. Beijing was outraged, not fully understanding that congressional action could contradict executive branch agreements.

**Ronald Reagan:** Taiwan became a presidential campaign issue in 1980, when Ronald Reagan refused to acknowledge the Shanghai Communiqué and repudiated Carter's "shameful abandonment of Taiwan" during the campaign. But Reagan as President was different from Reagan as candidate.

Ironically, Reagan, America's best known anti-communist and Taiwan advocate, would forge a closer relationship with China from 1983 to 1988 than the two countries had before or have had since. In August 1982, negotiations produced a third communiqué, where mutual respect for sovereignty was reaffirmed, and the US pledged to gradually reduce its arms sales to Taiwan, further stabilizing the relationship.<sup>11</sup> As Reagan turned his attention to the "evil empire," what he labeled the Soviet Union, Washington raised China's strategic value. At the same time, Deng Xiaoping in Beijing launched economic reforms that brought China double digit growth, paving the way for booming US investments and trade. The Chinese were once again becoming more like us – drinking Coca-Cola and eating McDonald's.

删除的内容: ,

By the late 1980s, 56,000 Chinese students and scholars were studying in the US.<sup>12</sup> The Reagan administration would relax controls on high-technology exports to China. Military-to-military relations flourished, including substantial arms sales. Chinese and US intelligence agencies worked together.

**George Bush (Bush 41)** In 1988, When George Bush, once head of the American Liaison Office in Beijing, was elected President, there was every expectation that US-China relations had finally matured beyond dangerous misperceptions and miscalculations, that the cyclic swings would stop.

### **1989-2000 (Turbulence Continues)**

June 4, 1989, however, put to rest all such expectations. As the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) shot its way through the streets of Beijing, crushing student and worker demonstrations protesting government corruption and demanding a more open society, television once again brought the Chinese government brutality and ruthlessness directly into American living rooms and changed for another generation how Americans would see China. The Chinese government, paranoid about "luan" or disorder, moved to reestablish control, at whatever the cost. They restored order, but images of the crackdown remain, and international shock and revulsion linger.

Nixon and Henry Kissinger, in their historic rapprochement with China, had set aside troubling questions about the nature of China's government. Tiananmen exposed this expedient accommodation and shattered the political and public consensus supporting US policies toward China. US-China relations have yet to fully recover, as Tiananmen coalesced both the American right and left in demanding punishment and sanctions against China. The Bush administration's efforts to maintain a cooperative relationship with China provoked a public outcry and gave rise to a continuing debate within Congress, a debate that cuts across traditional divisions among Democrats and Republicans seeking retribution. The coup de grace came at the end of 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the US no longer needed China to counterbalance the Soviet threat.

**Bill Clinton:** In the 1992 presidential campaign Bill Clinton made China an issue as he attacked President George Bush for coddling the "Butchers of Beijing." In his first year as President, Clinton tried to link renewal of most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) for China to human rights. But in the 1990s China and the US had become inextricably linked by trade and commerce. Robert Rubin, then Chairman of the National Economic Council said in a January 1994 *New York Times* article that it was imperative to have an economic relationship with China.<sup>13</sup> Not surprisingly, just four months later Clinton put an end to linking China's human rights performance to MFN approval.

In another year Clinton would have to reverse himself again – this time with dire consequences for US China policy. Under pressure now from a Republican Congress, the Clinton administration made an about face and granted a visa to President Lee Tenghui of

Taiwan to speak at his alma mater Cornell University. The Chinese felt the US had betrayed the very foundation of US-China relations – the one China policy – and relations plummeted, reaching its nadir in 1996 on the eve of Taiwan's first direct presidential elections. Anticipating that Washington would not react, China engaged in missile diplomacy to show Taiwan what would happen if the island ever formally declared independence. Surprising the Chinese, Washington dispatched two carrier task forces to the area to preserve the principle of unhindered navigation through international waters and to encourage a "peaceful resolution" of outstanding issues between Beijing and Taipei.

Both countries awakened to the high stakes involved when US-China relations are mismanaged and began to pull back from the brink. Clinton enunciated a new, more coherent approach toward China. On May 17, 1996, Secretary of State Warren Christopher gave a policy address in New York, calling for "engagement not confrontation" with China.<sup>14</sup> Beijing welcomed this new China policy framework, which led to reciprocal summit visits between the two presidents.

The most important result of this summitry was the October 1997 "Joint Statement" that committed both countries "to build toward a constructive strategic partnership" in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>15</sup> I was in the audience at Peking University when Clinton spoke on campus in June, 1998, and the spirit of partnership was palpable. The glow from this presidential summitry would soon fade, however, because for all the apparent good feelings, nothing substantive had changed in US-China relations.

The pendulum would swing again to bring US-China relations to a new low. 1999 saw China smeared across the front pages of American newspapers, on the nightly news and Sunday talk shows, in congressional hearings and courtrooms -- charged with alleged espionage, theft of US nuclear and technology secrets, and accused of trying to steal presidential elections through illegal campaign contributions.

But nothing prepared either country for the accidental NATO bombing (May, 1999) of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, which killed three people and injured 20. Again from the campus of Peking University, I witnessed four days of anti-American frenzy that followed. Some of my students joined protestors pelting the American Embassy with anything they could lay their hands on, but I never once felt any sense of personal danger, and my classes continued without incident after a brief hiatus. The US-China relationship, however, plunged to its lowest depth since the PLA shot its way into Tiananmen in 1989.

Despite these ill fated events, President Clinton ended his two terms in office on a high note in US-China relations, as the US finally ended 13 years of negotiations and agreed on

terms for China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). His administration successfully moved China policy beyond crisis-management when Congress approved permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status for China, taking the annual reviews of the relationship off the political calendar.

The promise of the Clinton presidency on China policy, however, fell far short. Clinton, himself, raised unrealistic expectations with his call for a strategic partnership with China. His administration would leave the big issues — proliferation, human rights and Taiwan — for his successor, George W. Bush.

删除的内容: --

删除的内容: prol

删除的内容: n --

### Bush 43's Evolving China Policy

When Bush took office, he seemed prepared to brand China this decade's version of the "Evil Empire," as President Reagan had labeled the Soviet Union. He also redefined China as a "strategic competitor" rather than Bill Clinton's "strategic partner". It was an open secret that divisions in his foreign policy team pitted Republican "traditionalists" on China against the "neoconservatives." The former favored a modus vivendi on Taiwan and an emphasis on engagement with China, while the latter advocated containing China, seeing the inevitability of a strong China becoming a threat.

删除的内容: Neoconservatives

带格式的

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

The "neocons" appeared to be gaining the upper hand when Bush pledged on "Good Morning America" (April 25, 2001) to defend Taiwan against China "whatever it takes." Despite the immediate backtracking, China suspected that the Bush Administration was trying to change the basic strategic assumptions of the last 30 years, and US-China relations once again seemed to be heading towards another collision.

删除的内容: Neoconservatives

带格式的

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

As if on cue, an actual collision did occur -- in April 2001, a US spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet near Hainan Island and plunged US-China relations yet into another crisis. I witnessed first hand the ensuing stand-off from the campus of Peking University.

Just as students and Chinese Internet chat rooms were full of recriminations that President Jiang Zemin had sold out to the US by returning the aircraft and its crew; so, the conservative *Weekly Standard* magazine accused President Bush of bringing "profound national humiliation" on the US by his "groveling" to China.<sup>16</sup>

This incident simultaneously reinforced the assertions of congressional and Bush administration hard-liners that Beijing is both a threat and not to be trusted, while, at the same time, it was claimed as evidence by Beijing's own hard-liners that Washington held hostile intentions towards China. There was palpable foreboding that each country would back itself into a corner.

Given the volatility of US-China relations, an unexpected mishap quickly turned into a policy crisis, as public opinion became inflamed in both China and the US. An April Gallup survey found that almost 70 percent of Americans saw China as “unfriendly or an enemy.”<sup>17</sup> The traditionalists prevailed in the Bush Administration’s handling of the incident, and in the end the two sides found a diplomatic solution, a reflection of how high the stakes really are in this bilateral relationship.

### **September 11**

In the wake of September 11, China has receded as a security threat, and the war against terror has opened an avenue of cooperation between the US and China, which could redefine the relationship in more constructive terms.

Jiang was among the first to call Bush with condolences on September 11. Despite the possibility of a long-term U.S. military presence in China’s own backyard and neighboring Central Asia, the Chinese government actually helped the US gain cooperation from Pakistan, Beijing’s longtime ally, in the anti-terrorism war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, US and Chinese intelligence have been sharing information about the al-Qaeda network and radical Islamic groups in Asia.

For all the reports of infighting among this Administration’s foreign policy team over the direction of US China policy, the President appears to be subtly repositioning his views on China squarely in line with those of his predecessors – Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton. For six successive US administrations, China policy has been guided by the principle that it is in the US national interest to help integrate China into the global community -- to work with China, not to isolate it.

As Nixon put it in his seminal October 1967 article in *Foreign Affairs*:

“Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors...For the long run, it means pulling China back into the world community – but as a great and progressing nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution.”<sup>18</sup>

The Bush administration reaffirmed this doctrine of integration when Richard N. Haass, Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, spoke before the Foreign Policy Association in April of 2002. He said, “In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the principal aim of American foreign policy is to integrate other countries and organizations into arrangements that will sustain a world consistent with US interests and values and thereby promote peace, prosperity, and justice as widely as possible.”<sup>19</sup>

At the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit held in Shanghai in the fall of 2001, President Bush had his first face-to-face meeting with President Jiang Zemin. Then, timing his visit to coincide with Nixon's historic visit 30 years ago to the day, Bush visited China again. In February 2002, Bush's summit visit to China revealed a president who knows how to temper ideology with pragmatism and who may be infusing a new realism into US-China relations. Or, as the *Washington Post* put it, "In Place of Chummy Talks, a Reality Check".<sup>20</sup> Bush praised Jiang for his cooperation on anti-terrorism, but he did not overindulge China's concerns, as it was felt Clinton had done, particularly on Taiwan and "one China". Bush never once publicly reaffirmed the three communiqués, as all his predecessors had, but he brought up the Taiwan Relations Act. As noted by students who questioned him at Tsinghua University, Bush always referred to the "peaceful settlement" of the Taiwan question, never once raising "peaceful reunification," China's preferred term.

Bush also warned in advance that he would raise human and religious rights in his speech at Tsinghua University. The president's language, however, was carefully nuanced to avoid insulting Jiang. As Bush said at one point in his meeting with Jiang, "China is not an enemy. Sometimes we will have our disagreements, but we will handle them with respect."<sup>21</sup>

It may be a sign of a maturing relationship that Bush and Jiang felt comfortable enough at their joint press conference to politely disagree on a number of points, including make or break issues for each. Jiang implied he would not support US military action against Iraq, and Bush could not be budged one inch in his support for Taiwan.

When the President's National Security Strategy was released in September 2002, it became clear that his administration had moved squarely into the engagement mode with China. The report says that the United States welcomes "the emergence of a strong, peaceful and prosperous China" and that it "seeks a constructive relationship with a changing China."<sup>22</sup>

删除的内容: In the third year of his presidency, President Bush, despite an uncertain beginning, has moved China policy squarely into the engagement mode.

删除的内容:

### China's New Pragmatism Towards the US

In politics and foreign policy, there is a force of what I learned, when I was US ambassador in Nepal, as *karma* or destiny. Bush 41's karma on China was ill-fated, but Bush 43 seems to have serendipity on his side.

The April 2001 spy plane incident was the last time that Beijing adopted an openly confrontational policy toward Washington. Since then, China has done its utmost to play down old differences and emphasize a new spirit of cooperation. Having joined the WTO,

been tapped to host the 2008 Olympic Games and seen its soccer team qualify for the first time for the World Cup Finals, China's growing international stature has boosted its confidence in dealing with the US, as well as taken the edge off of the historic Chinese sensitivities from 150 years of humiliation.

Indeed, Chinese leaders have responded with restraint, for example, to several US actions that normally would have provoked apoplectic reactions:

- When the Bush administration announced the most extensive arms-sale package in years to Taiwan in the spring of 2001, Beijing expressed bland, perfunctory protests.
- When the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) in December 2001, Beijing's protests were decidedly muted even though a U.S. missile defense system would nullify China's nuclear deterrent capacity.
- The discovery of bugging devices on a plane outfitted in the United States for President Jiang did not produce any official charges of spying. Nor did the state-controlled media launch an anti-U.S. propaganda campaign. The Chinese media virtually ignored the incident.
- When DOD's Nuclear Posture Review,<sup>23</sup> which lists China among seven nations as possible nuclear strike targets, was leaked, China's reactions were not much more critical than those of Russia, not to mention Germany or the United Kingdom.
- After the Bush Administration authorized Taiwan's president, vice president and premier to hold meetings with US members of Congress on American soil; and the first visa in 25 years to a Taiwan defense minister and his meeting with Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of State for Asia Jim Kelly in Florida, China's leadership predictably reacted strongly. Xinhua, China's official news agency, speculated that the much anticipated visit by Vice President Hu Jintao might be cancelled. Hu Jintao, however, came to the States as scheduled and completed a successful first visit.

China opposed the United States decision to go to war against Iraq without international support, but now-President Hu Jintao assured President Bush in a phone call that this disagreement will "not become a stumbling block in bilateral relations" between the two countries.<sup>24</sup>

带格式的：正文，左，右 0.5 字符，段落间距段后：0.5 行，行距：固定值 15 磅，无项目符号或编号

带格式的：字体：（默认）Arial，五号，字体颜色：自动设置

带格式的：默认段落字体，字体颜色：自动设置

带格式的：字体：（默认）Arial，五号，字体颜色：自动设置

China's new pragmatism is a reflection of a changing calculus of its strategic interests and realities. China's economic development and modernization drive requires a stable and good relationship with the US, as its growth and prosperity increasingly depend on the US market, technology and investments. A policy of avoiding confrontation with the US is also consistent with China's domestic political agenda, as its new leaders turn their focus on internal problems, which the SARS epidemic has highlighted.

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

Hu's ascension in March, 2003 capped an orderly transition to a new generation in the Communist Party, government and military, China's first normal transfer of power in the country's history. The first public statements of Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao have stressed the need to help the tens of millions of rural poor and the unemployed left destitute by the closure of state enterprises. Both groups are considered threats to social stability, which Chinese leaders value above all else.

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号, 字体颜色: 自动设置

带格式的: 左, 右 0.5 字符,  
段落间距段后: 0.5 行, 行距:  
固定值 15 磅

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

China's hosting of talks between the US and North Korea in April, 2003 to address North Korea's nuclear activity is an indication that China's new pragmatism towards the US will stay the course. Another indication will come later in the fall of 2003 when the US and China will for the first time, since 1996, resume high-level military talks for cooperation involving proliferation, cross-border crimes and anti-terrorism.

删除的内容: President George W. Bush has an unusual window of opportunity to move US-China relations beyond the legacy of his predecessors. Since September 11, the relationship has shifted closer once again, submerging differences. In fact, the Chinese and American heads of state have met more times during this period than ever in the history of US-China relations.

删除的内容: renewed cooperation

删除的内容: led to unrealistic expectations, misperceptions and miscalculation

删除的内容:

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

删除的内容: Times appear propitious, but the wild card is Taiwan

删除的内容:

删除的内容: Neoconservatives

删除的内容: are

删除的内容: ing

删除的内容: to

带格式的

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

删除的内容:  
The margin of error for all three sides on this incendiary issue is small. China expert David Michael Lampton calls Taiwan the "for keeps" issue in the US-China relationship. All bets are off if the balance, maintained by 30 years of creative ambiguity, is broken.

## Conclusion

The alignment of China's new pragmatism and the Bush administration's current engagement strategy toward China offers President George W. Bush an unusual window of opportunity to move US-China relations beyond the legacy of his predecessors. How long this new period of "respect" will last, however, will depend on whether the leadership in both countries can overcome the differences in national experience and the mutual perception gaps that have time and again fed the cycles of love and hate.

Cooperation on terrorism post-September 11 is a new and positive dimension in US-China relations, but concerns in Washington about China's military posture against Taiwan remain. The "neocons" continue to push for change in the 30 year policy of "strategic ambiguity" on Taiwan, which has provided a framework for US-China détente on the issue. Balancing on contrasting world views, the policy calls for the US to caution China on the use of force against Taiwan, but, also, not to categorically pledge to defend the island. China also was assured that the US would not support Taiwan's independence, but, at the same time, Taiwan got the advanced weapons needed to defend itself.

Since Nixon, the Taiwan issue has bedeviled US-China relations, threatening not only the ability of the two countries to sustain constructive ties, but also the peace and stability of the region, if not the world. The margin of error for all three sides on this incendiary issue is

删除的内容: and



small. China expert David Michael Lampton calls Taiwan the “for keeps” issue in the US-China relationship. All bets are off if the balance, maintained by 30 years of creative ambiguity, is broken.

Behind the current warming of ties, moreover, there remain powerful forces both outside and within the administration ready to remind President Bush of what they perceive as the China threat and, therefore, the need to curtail US dealings with China, including technology transfers, investments and trade, as well as military-to-military contacts. An example of this view can be seen in a major report issued by the US-China Security Review Commission, one of two commissions mandated by Congress to monitor US-China ties.<sup>25</sup>

Nevertheless, times appear propitious, probably better now than ever before, to stabilize America's love-hate relationship with China, as September 11 has shifted the relationship closer once again, submerging differences. Also, for the first time since its contact with the US, China now has the confidence of a relatively stable country, moving with increasing stature into its place in the global community.

删除的内容:

President Bush has used high level face-to-face meetings with Chinese leaders to good effect in building trust and confidence. The Chinese and American heads of state have met more times during this period than ever in the history of US-China relations. While summits more often are occasions for photo ops rather than policymaking, they offer leaders face time if not to better understand each other, then at least to see each other more clearly – give each other a reality check.

删除的内容: Given China's recent pragmatism and Bush's two visits to China and, also, meeting with China's new president, there is hope that realism will prevail. More important is the economic reality that "peaceful unification" by Taiwanese and Chinese business is already well underway.

More high level meetings, more consultations and more dialogues at government and non-governmental levels will help break down the vast cultural gaps that distort how each country perceives the other and go a long way toward stopping the all too familiar love-hate cycles from resuming their repetitive and destructive swings.

US-China relations could use a good dose of realism. These cyclical swings stem, at least in part, from a chronic failure of each to perceive the other as it really is.

删除的内容:

The Bush-Jiang summit visits left US-China relations the better for them. President Bush left Beijing, and then-President Jiang left the Crawford, Texas ranch with US-China relations grounded not in confrontation or strategic embrace, but in the realism of cooperation when possible. The fierce in-fighting among Bush's foreign policy team has taken the romance out of US-China relations, but that may be exactly what is needed to stop the cyclical swings – to stabilize US-China relations once and for all, something that has eluded all six of President bush's predecessors, including his father.

删除的内容: it

删除的内容:

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 五号

收稿日期: 2003-06-25

**作者简介:** Julia Chang Bloch 曾担任美国驻尼泊尔王国大使, 为美国第一位亚裔驻外大使。现为美国马里兰大学全球华人事务研究所主任, 北京大学和复旦大学 Starr 高级访问学者, 复旦大学美国研究中心访问教授。

**Resume of Ambassador Julia Chang Bloch:** She is Ambassador-in-Residence at the University of Maryland, College Park, Institute for Global Chinese Affairs. She is also the Starr Senior Fellow for US-China Relations at Peking University in Beijing and Fudan University in Shanghai, China

Ambassador Bloch earned a bachelor's degree in Communications and Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1964, and a master's degree in Government and East Asia Regional Studies from Harvard University in 1967. She was awarded an honorary doctorate of Humane Letters from Northeastern University in 1986. She culminated her career as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Nepal in 1989, the first Asian American to hold such rank in U.S. history.

<sup>1</sup> Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches On Our Minds: American Views of China and India (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1980).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, 71.

<sup>3</sup> Steven W. Mosher, China Perceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality (New York: Basic Books, 1990).

<sup>4</sup> R. Arkush and Leo O. Lee, eds. Land Without Ghosts: Chinese Impressions of America from the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 302.

<sup>5</sup> See The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

<sup>6</sup> Isaacs, 96

<sup>7</sup> Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York, London: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc. 1990), 232.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 235.

<sup>9</sup> Isaacs, xxv.

<sup>10</sup> See CNN Cold War Historical Documents, Episode 15: China.

<sup>11</sup> "Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, August 17, 1982" – United States Information Service. <http://www.fmprc.org.cn/eng/7153.html>.

<sup>12</sup> Orleans, Leo A. "Chinese Students in America: Policies, Issues, and Numbers." The National Academic Press, 1988 pp. 111-113 <http://books.nap.edu/>.

<sup>13</sup> "US Urged to Shift China Policy on Trade" The New York Times, January 30, Sunday late edition, 1994.

<sup>14</sup> "American Interests and the US-China Relationship" Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the Asia Society, the Council on Foreign Relations and National Committee on US-China Relations. May 17, 1996. State Department Archives using Dosfan.

<sup>15</sup> See "The United States and China: State Visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, October 28-30, 1997," Department of State International Information Programs.

<sup>16</sup> Weekly Standard Magazine, April 6, 2001 editorial by Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan.

<sup>17</sup> "Poll shows Americans think less of China after spy plane incident," CNN.com/US, April 23, 2001.

<sup>18</sup> Cited in David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 67.

<sup>19</sup> Richard N. Haass, "Defining US Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World." Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, April 22, 2002.

<sup>20</sup> By John Pomfret and Philip P. Pan Washington Post Foreign Service, Friday, February 22, 2002; Page A20.

带格式的: 左, 右 0.5 字符

带格式的: 右 0.5 字符, 段落间距段后: 2.5 磅, 行距: 固定值 15 磅

带格式的: 左, 右 0.5 字符

带格式的: 右 0.5 字符, 段落间距段后: 2.5 磅, 行距: 固定值 15 磅

删除的内容:

带格式的: 字体: (默认) Arial, 五号

带格式的: 字体: (默认) Arial, 小五

删除的内容:

删除的内容:

删除的内容: <sup>12</sup> Orleans, Leo A. "Chinese Students in America: Policies, Issues, and Numbers." 1988. the National Academic Press, pp. 111-113 <http://books.nap.edu/>

删除的内容: <sup>14</sup>

删除的内容:

删除的内容:

删除的内容: <sup>15</sup> See "The United States and China: State Visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin, October 28-30, 1997," Department of State International Information Programs

<sup>21</sup> White House transcript, Background Briefing by a Senior Administration Official on President Bush's Meeting with Chinese President Jiang Zemin and South Korean President kim Dae Jung, October 19, 2001.

<sup>22</sup> [National Security Strategy of the United States of America](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, September 2002

<sup>23</sup> See [DefenseLink](#), U.S. Department of Defense, News Transcript, Jan. 9, 2002.

<sup>24</sup> Chris Buckley, "China tiptoes between opposing the war and not angering U.S." March 25, 2003 The New York Times.

<sup>25</sup> ["The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship between the United States and China."](#) prepared by the US-China Security Review Commission, Washington, DC July 2002.

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, (中文) 楷体\_GB2312,  
小五

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 小五

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 小五, 下划线

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 小五

删除的内容:

收稿日期: 2003-06-25

**作者简介:** Julia Chang Bloch 曾担任美国驻尼泊尔王国大使, 为美国第一位亚裔驻外大使。现为美国马里兰大学全球华人事务研究所主任, 北京大学和复旦大学 Starr 高级访问学者, 复旦大学美国研究中心访问教授。

**Resume of Ambassador Julia Chang Bloch:** She is Ambassador-in-Residence at the University of Maryland, College Park, Institute for Global Chinese Affairs. She is also the Starr Senior Fellow for US-China Relations at Peking University in Beijing and Fudan University in Shanghai, China. Ambassador Bloch earned a bachelor's degree in Communications and Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1964, and a master's degree in Government at ... [17]

带格式的: 字体: (默认)  
Arial, 小五

带格式的

带格式的: 字体: 加粗

带格式的

带格式的: 字体: 加粗

带格式的

带格式的: 字体: Times New Roman, 小四

带格式的: 字体: Times New Roman, 小四, 非加粗

带格式的: 字体: Times New Roman, 小四

带格式的: 字体: Times New Roman, 小四

带格式的: 字体: Times New Roman, 小四

带格式的: 字体: Times New Roman, 小四

带格式的: 字体: Times New Roman, 小四

带格式的: 字体: Times New Roman, 小四

带格式的: 字体: Times New Roman, 小四

带格式的

页 1: [1] 带格式的 字体: 小五, 非加粗	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [1] 带格式的 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [1] 带格式的 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [1] 带格式的 字体: 小五	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [1] 带格式的 字体: 小五	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [2] 带格式的 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [2] 带格式的 字体: (默认) Arial, 小五, 非加粗	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [3] 带格式的 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [3] 带格式的 字体: (默认) Arial, 小五	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [4] 删除的内容	xinqiang	2003-7-4 21:08:00
页 1: [5] 带格式的 字体: (默认) Arial, 小五	z	2003-9-3 10:03:00
页 1: [6] 带格式的 左, 右 0.5 字符, 段落间距段后: 0.5 行, 行距: 固定值 15 磅	z	2003-9-3 11:46:00

页 1: [7] 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
---------------	---	-------------------

字体: (默认) Arial, 小五

页 1: [8] 删除的内容	z	2004-9-3 9:58:00
----------------	---	------------------

页 1: [8] 删除的内容	z	2003-9-3 10:02:00
----------------	---	-------------------

页 1: [9] 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
---------------	---	-------------------

字体: (默认) Arial, 五号

页 1: [10] 删除的内容	z	2004-9-3 9:58:00
-----------------	---	------------------

#### Summary:

The US-China relationship has been turbulent from the start, locked into love-hate cycles beset by crises. Factors contributing to these cycles have been the two countries' vastly different histories, cultures and national experiences, which have produced gaps in perception, miscalculations and unrealistic expectations by both sides.

Using the cycles of love and hate as a framework, the paper examines the more than two-hundred years of interaction between the two countries: 1784-1840: Respect; 1840-1900: Contempt; 1900-1949: Benevolence; 1949-1972: Hostility; 1972-1989: Benevolence and Admiration Again; 1989-2000: Turbulence Continues

Since September 11, the US-China relationship has improved significantly, a development that may be unsurpassed by previous periods in its history. Although current cooperation has created a new age of respect, the underlying tensions between the two countries, including the Taiwan question, remain unchanged.

The United States and China are currently in a position to break the love-hate cycles that have characterized the relationship. Increasing face-time between the heads of state, as well as more dialogue and interaction at all levels of society may in time narrow the cultural gap and dispel misperceptions and myths that each country has concocted about the other. Over time, this may prevent the love-hate cycles from resuming their repetitive and destructive swings, and a stable, productive relationship can ensue.

页 1: [11] 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
----------------	---	-------------------

字体: (默认) Arial, 小五

页 1: [11] 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
字体: (默认) Arial, 小五		
页 1: [11] 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
带格式的		
页 1: [11] 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
字体: (默认) Arial, 小五		
页 1: [11] 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
字体: (默认) Arial, 小五		
页 1: [12] 删除的内容	z	2003-9-3 10:02:00

*PAPER PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN FORUM*

*JOURNAL OF THE FUDAN UNIVERSITY CENTER OF AMERICAN STUDIES*

*JUNE 30, 2003*

-----分页符-----

页 1: [13] 带格式的	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
字体: (默认) Arial, 五号		

页 1: [14] 删除的内容	z	2003-9-3 10:02:00
页 1: [15] 带格式的 字体: (中文) 楷体_GB2312, 小五	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [15] 带格式的 字体: (默认) Arial, (中文) 楷体_GB2312, 小五	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 1: [16] 带格式的 字体: (默认) Arial, 五号	z	2004-9-3 10:00:00
页 17: [17] 删除的内容	z	2004-9-3 10:01:00

收稿日期: 2003-06-25

**作者简介:** Julia Chang Bloch 曾担任美国驻尼泊尔王国大使，为美国第一位亚裔驻外大使。现为美国马里兰大学全球华人事务研究所主任，北京大学和复旦大学 Starr 高级访问学者，复旦大学美国研究中心访问教授。

**Resume of Ambassador Julia Chang Bloch:** She is Ambassador-in-Residence at the University of Maryland, College Park, Institute for Global Chinese Affairs. She is also the Starr Senior Fellow for US-China Relations at Peking University in Beijing and Fudan University in Shanghai, China

Ambassador Bloch earned a bachelor's degree in Communications and Public Policy from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1964, and a master's degree in Government and East Asia Regional Studies from Harvard University in 1967. She was awarded an honorary doctorate of Humane Letters from Northeastern University in 1986. She culminated her career as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Nepal in 1989, the first Asian American to hold such rank in U.S. history.