Conceptualizing Citizenship: How the “Post-80” Activists in Hong Kong Understand Citizenship Rights, Obligations and Identities

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Abstract: This study examines the conceptions of citizenship rights, obligations and identities of the “post-80” youth activists in Hong Kong. Using mainly in-depth interview materials, this study finds that although in the minds of these youth activists, citizenship is a complex matter, combined with elements from both liberal and communitarian traditions, there are obvious signs showing that these young people tend to give a pro-communitarian interpretation regarding the role of the ‘self’ vis-a-vis their fellow citizens and the political community. The most obvious traits indicate this trend include: 1) a strong rights-consciousness, and a self-definition of the sequence of social-political-civil rights; 2) a fresh recognition of political participation as obligation and a growing enthusiasm in practical engagement, as compared with the conventional vision of political apathy of the public in general; 3) a strong sense of local identity, as contrasted with the traditional image of Hongkongers as utilitarian-individualism. Finally, while adding to the understanding of the conceptualizations of citizenship, the findings also underscore the importance of investigating the relationship of citizenship conception to participatory behavior to gain more complete understandings of a person’s view of citizenship and his or her political participation.

Key Words: Communitarian Citizenship, Liberalist Citizenship, “Post-80” Youth Activists, Hong Kong

Introduction

Political activism can be understood as an expression of citizenship in action. In order to explore this claim, this article attempts to answer “what is citizenship?” from the perspective of youth activists in Hong Kong who have been regularly engaged in social movements in recent years, and then examines whether their conceptions of citizenship rights, obligations and identities are related to their participatory behaviors. The study begins with a brief overview of two intellectual traditions regarding the meaning of citizenship, and develops upon these theoretical approaches an analytical framework to understand citizenship within different empirical and historical contexts. This framework is then used to understand and delineate the status quo of citizenship conception in the minds of these youth activists. Finally, questions such as “why did you participate in the first place?” and “why do you participate all the way?” are asked to elucidate the dialectical relationship between the perceptions of citizenship and the behavior of political activism.

The analysis is unfolded in the context of Hong Kong, where both political authority and academic commentaries (e.g., Lau and Kuan, 1988, 1995) have overwhelmingly taken the general Hongkongers as passive ‘subject’, rather than active citizens. It was possibly true considering Hong Kong’s special history as a British colony and a refugee society, with both the future of the territory and that of individual inhabitants
remained unsettled, leaving no favorable historical political conditions or incentives for the construction of a definite and active political self. However, as most commentators (but see, Lam 2007) have explicitly pointed out, this image of “political apathy” is only applicable to the political scenario of Hong Kong before its history in the 1980s. Only beginning from the 1980s, when the Chinese leaders made known their determination to resume full sovereignty of Hong Kong after 1997, did genuine political transformation took place in Hong Kong. As Pepper (2000: 411) has put it, political development in Hong Kong is usually characterized as minimal to non-existent until the early 1980s. This is the period when the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed, establishing the basic parameters for Hong Kong’s transition to Chinese sovereignty, settling down the major framework for the political development of the post-handover era, and paving the way for the formation, reformation and transformation of both new and old political and social forces. This is the period when the first direct elections – the 1985 district board elections – were held, the constellation of democratic interest groups began to coalesce, and the early quasi-political-parties emerged. This is the period that public concern over the mechanics and consequences of the transition process grew intensively, a period that “a participant political culture began to emerge” (Baum 2000: 444-445). This is also the period when the Beijing issue peaked Hong Kong people’s apprehension and even abomination towards China’s intervention and anti-democratic intentions, which later on became the most-seated element cutting through the political cleavages in the local political arena and shaping the conflict dynamics dominating throughout the post-handover era.

Suppose Pepper is right, that, the political development in Hong Kong only began in the early 1980s, then after three decades of practice, the political landscape must have changed dramatically compared with the embryonic status of the 1980s. These dynamics should be detected in the room of Legislative Council, as well as in the mind of ordinary hongkong residents. Ironically however, not much research has been done to record the new evidence of political activism of ordinary Hongkongers, although inquiries into the issues of electoral politics in the HKSAR era has figured prominently in the research on local political development (e.g., Kuan 2000; Lau and Kuan 2002; Ma 1999; Ma and Choy 2003). Among the few studies that touch upon the theme of political participation of the Hongkongers in general, most are quantitative studies featured by the popular attitudinal studies (e.g., Cheng 1989, ). Only several are qualitative analysis delineating the evolutionary history and main patterns of political movement in the local community (see, Cheng 1989; Lam 2007). The studies however, are outdated to some extent, as most of them focus on the political participation of Hong Kong people in general before the mass demonstration in 2003, with only one latest study as an exception (Chan and Lee 2005). In addition, they tend to portrait a general pattern of political participation of the whole population, without articulating extensively on one specific social group. However, the most significant outcome of social transformation afoot over the years – the politicalization and radicalization of young Hongkongers, is left unexamined.
Political stagnation, economic recession, and the deterioration of social equality and social justice have caused the Hong Kong SAR a serious legitimacy crisis, which galvanized a wave of mass protests led by a new generation of youth activists, those so-called “post-80” activists\(^1\) arising from the “Anti-XRL” movements\(^2\) in Hong Kong from the end of 2009. Unlike their precedent activists, these critical young men refuse any kind of organizational stereotype. Instead, they have retained a loosely-connected network structure to frame contested issues and mobilize potential supporters and participants. This strategy, as said by themselves, saves them time and resources that a formal organization with hierarchy would have consumed, and facilitates them to communicate simultaneously between different issue domains and movement arenas; thus, is the most efficient way available. Engaged now extensively in various types of protest movement for full democracy, these young activists are claiming to fight for the well-being for the whole citizenry in the territory, disdaining any kind of conventional channels of political communication, including political parties or even civil society organizations. They made it loud and clear that they, as a Hong Kong citizen, will take every possible move to exert their rights and fulfill their obligations to construct a fully-democratic and highly-civilized Hong Kong; a Hong Kong that not belongs to any single substance of authority, but to all the Hongkongers.

As alluded above, it is obvious that the scenario of political apathy has changed in recent years. Since its reunification with China, Hong Kong has be reshaped by a series of transformation that have included and resulted in changes to established patterns of industrial structure, employment, social strata, life style, interests and identities of individuals. On one hand, the ways in which economic and social deprivation and marginalization are corrosive of citizenship in the political, civil, and social spheres were spelt out starkly in the local community, especially the community of youth. On the other, the vibrant e-network of community groups in such areas demonstrated how, against all the odds, genuine active citizenship is alive and well in the domain of youth civil society. This is particularly true when thinking about the meaning of citizenship.

**The Meaning of Citizenship**

Citizenship is one of those slippery terms which everyone understands at one level but about which it is difficult to arrive at an agreed definition. This is partly because of the variety of elements that can be taken to constitute citizenship, reflecting two very different traditions (see below), and partly because, as one

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\(^1\) The concept of “Post-80” was first popularly used in mainland China, where people use it to refer to a particular generation – those who were born in the 1980s. This concept was borrowed by several young activists in Hong Kong and first publicly used by them in mid-2009 when they were mobilizing young Hongkongers to participate in a special cultural ceremony. Later on, with the outbreak of the “Anti-XRL” movements, the core activists in the movement, most of whom happened to belong to the “post-80” generation, captured this concept and used it to symbolize themselves. The “Post-80” then became a particular symbol in the local discourse to represent the young activists who participated in the “Anti-XRL” movements.

\(^2\) The “Anti-XRL” movements, abbreviated from the “Anti-High-Speed-Rail-Way” movements, refer to a series of movements happened in Hong Kong from 2009 to 2010. These movements were mainly led and participated by “Post-80” youth activists to protest against the local government’s proposal to construct a quite costly High-Speed Railway Link from Shenzhen, a Mainland city to the downtown of Hong Kong.
citizenship theorist noted 'the way we define citizenship is intimately linked to the kind of social and political community we want' (Mouffe, 1992: 225). In contemporary political debate, citizenship has been invoked in campaigns for more effective civil and political rights and in promoting social rights. The language of citizenship has also been deployed by various social movements such as the feminist movement. In mainstream political debate, however, there has been a shift in emphasis from a discourse of citizenship rights to one of citizenship obligations in a number of countries.

These competing understandings of citizenship reflect two very different historical traditions, one – the liberalistic approach – which emphasizes the individual and his rights and the other – the communitarian approach – which emphasizes the community and the obligations of individuals to that community. Or, as one commentator has put it, one which emphasizes citizenship as a status and the other which emphasizes it as a practice (Oldfield, 1990). Among those who hold citizenship to be a status are both classical liberals, who would confine citizenship to the formal civil and political rights necessary to protect individual freedom, and those who, following T. H. Marshall, would include social rights as necessary to the promotion of a more positive notion of freedom. For many, Marshall's Citizenship and Social Class (1950) provides the touchstone for thinking about citizenship. The key elements of his definition are membership of a community; the rights and obligations which flow from that membership; and the equality of status.

Studies on citizenship rights afterwards have seldom succeeded to escape from the framework of Marshall. Nonetheless, further elaboration on the internal relationships between the elements of citizenship rights, the relationship between rights and obligations, and the antagonistic relationship between equal citizenship rights and an unequal class structure have definitely supplemented the entire theory of citizenship. With regard to the internal relations among different components of citizenship rights, Barbalet (1988: 15-28) finds that Marshall has paid too much attention on the contradiction between citizenship and social class, leaving little room for discussion on the internal tensions within citizenship itself. Between the lines of Marshall’s analysis on the historical emergence of citizenship rights, there lies an implicit assumption of the internal relationship between all the elements as being “logical compatible” and sometimes mutual reinforcing. With a particular emphasis on citizenship rights, Barbalet attach “a set of rights” as one of the two elements constituting the essence of citizenship, with a “status” as the other one element. According to him, citizenship rights are much more than merely legal or constitutional entitlements which grant citizens with certain capabilities or opportunities for particular actions, they not only constitute a reflection of citizen’s status as a full member of the political community and guarantee the meaningful practice of the status “with an accomplished and achieved reality” (Barbalet 1988: 15), but also takes more important roles such as constraining the power of the state, representing and structuring social relationships and interests, and inducing the emergence and enhancement of institutional development. Differences between elements of citizenship rights are obvious when we examine the relations between each element and state, as well as the relationship between each element and the social
class structure. With concern of the former relationship, C. B. Macpherson (1985: 23) has stated the different ways that civil rights and social rights constrain the state, that is, while civil rights are rights against the state, social rights are claims for benefits guaranteed by the state. With regard of the latter relationship, Barbalet interprets Marshall’s work and finds that Marshall recognizes the compatibility between civil rights and capitalism inequality whereas regrets the inherent tensions between the other two elements and the unequal capitalism system.

However comprehensive the study on the internal relations between different components of citizenship rights is, it is of limited theoretical merits because the discussion is so confined within “right” itself. In fact, as revealed by Elizabeth Kingdom (in Christodoulidis 1998: 104), there has already been a sign of tiredness or even irritation over the right debate, the debate about the adequacy of appealing to and pursuing rights for the realization of progressive and radical objectives. She goes on to list that “Didi Herman (1993) advocates going ‘beyond it’ and Carl Stychin refers to the ‘vacuity of the pro-rights/anti-rights debates often heard in the United Kingdom’” (Elizabeth Kingdom, in Christodoulidis 1998: 104). Only we jump out of a sheer examination of the internal formation of citizenship to attach other broader theoretical issues such as the state, the social structure or the socioeconomic transformation are we able to detect complex causal relations between the formation of citizenship and external factors which contributes to or are contributed by the particular internal structure of citizenship. That would be more interesting and meaningful for the purpose of theory construction and empirical prediction.

This idea of participation as a citizenship right represents a bridge to the other citizenship tradition – the communitarian interpretation which has its roots in ancient Greece and Rome. Here the citizen is an active participant in governance and politics for the good of the wider community. There has been something of a resurgence in this tradition, especially in the USA, in reaction against the individualism of the dominant liberal citizenship paradigm. This, it is argued by some, represents an impoverished understanding in which individual citizens are reduced to atomized, passive bearers of rights and citizenship is transformed from a collective political activity to the pursuit of individual economic interests.

A communitarian view on citizenship also strengthens the duties of the citizens to responsibly participate in the political, social and everyday lifestyles of their community. Thus, liberalism centers their emphasis on individual rights and a serious defense of the inviolable autonomy for the individual as an independent member of the community, opposing to any violations on the individual rights from both fellow citizens and the state, and a fully legitimate demand to the state to provide and protect all kinds of individual rights. Communitarian, by criticizing the extreme individualism of liberalism, emphasizes on a moral responsibility of the citizens to fulfill their legal and moral obligations by cooperating kindly with their fellow citizens, to participate actively in the public affairs and work for the common good of the whole community. The
language of Communitarian which calls for a moral obligation of individual citizen towards his families, relatives, colleagues, friends, and even stranger fellow citizens; towards groups, organizations, institutions, and even the whole political community, both locally and nationally. This warn identification between fellow citizens and also citizenry as a whole towards the state not only strengthens a sense of social solidarity, but also help to nurture a collective identity.

The discussion on communitarianism then takes us to another theoretical perspective on citizenship, which could be labeled as an identity approach. The implicit assumption of communitarianism is that individual citizen is inherently located on a complex net of various inter-relations with other citizens, organizations, institutions, and in a word, is inherently embedded within the whole socioeconomic and political context. To an extreme extent, there is no such thing as absolute individual interest. Inside the notion of individual interest, there is always a component of public interest or at least a common interest between more than two citizens. As a social actor, individual citizens are correlated with each other by different forms of ties at the first place. Thus, commonalities among citizens have taken into being as soon as the social interactions unfolded and as long as these interactions continue. However, these commonalities are not necessarily or naturally recognized by all citizens. The realization of communitarian obligations lays the foundation for, but not directly leads to the construction of a social self and then an identity of citizenship.

As noted by Tilly (1996: 20-21), recent work on both the consciousness of nineteenth-century working people by Patrick Joyce, James Vernon and Linda Colley and the history of citizenship by Margaret Somers now questions the evolutionary character of rights and the quintessential role of class in Marshall’s thesis. Partly focusing on issues of collective identity, these revisionists explore issues of rights consciousness largely absent in Marshall’s legacy. In the process they counter with alternative histories emphasizing the local and uneven development of citizenship identities and shifting and contingent nature of the claimed rights contained within them.

Amongst others, Margaret Somers (1993) provides the most direct, compelling and far-reaching challenge to Marshall in her analyses of citizenship and narrative identity. Using both institutional and narrative approaches to analyze collective identity. Somers argues that consciousness of citizenship was the shifting product of local struggles between working people, employers and state authorities centuries prior to the advent of the Industrial Revolution. She locates this process of working people in pastoral and arable regions of the country as they claimed rights due them within a national legal or public sphere. The actualization of laws into recognized rights was based on local action by cohesive groups most generally located in the rural-industrial/pastoral regions of England where textile production was significant. Cemented by concrete ties of community, family and trade these working people made claims of citizenship through the procedural justice of the local magistracy; they thus structured narratives of their rights as citizens based on uniform national
codes through local institutions tied to the state (Somers 1993: 597). Struggles over labor conditions were thus always enacted through the appropriation by the “people” of the law. Rights as “free-born Englishmen” were not simply provided by the state but were based in contingent collective claims pressed by working people within the local node of a national legal structure.

Somers noted that collective identities of citizenship were always constructed and pursued through a language of rights that combined and refracted class and political claims. The central narrative through which such claims were actualized was one in which “working people had inviolable rights to particular political and legal relationships. They claimed these rights as citizens and focused on a particular understanding of the law, a particular understanding of the ‘people’ and their membership in the political community, and a particular relationship of the people and the law”. (Somers 1992: 612) This narrative tenaciously endured through the centuries and remained central to working people’s conceptions of citizenship even in the face of the expansion of Lockean natural rights arguments with the growth of a bourgeois political culture. Nineteenth-century movements such as those for the Factory Acts, Chartism, and the growth of trade unionism “were built primarily on the efforts, political identities, and social activities of rural industrial working peoples” through this narrative identity of the people. (Somers 1993: 611)

Although these two traditions tend to be seen as competing and even incompatible, it is possible to make the case for a synthesis of the two. Central to this synthesis is the notion of human agency, defined by the political theorist Carol Gould as a process of self-development: “of concretely becoming the person one chooses to be through carrying out those actions that express one’s purposes and needs”(1988: 47). This process takes place in a social context and in developing the self, the individual is also acting upon, and thereby potentially changing the world, a world which at the same time structures the choices available. It thus draws on a dual understanding of Communitarian notion of “citizenship as participation”: on the one hand, participation can be seen as representing an expression of human agency in the political arena; on the other hand, the liberalism version of “citizenship as rights” enables people to act as agents.

**Citizenship and Youth Activism**

The remainder of this paper takes on board this more generous understanding of the relationship of citizenship to youth activism in Hong Kong. As part of a larger study of citizenship and youth activism in Hong Kong, this study focuses on the young activist’ perceptions of citizenship rights, duties, and identities. Although these topics constitute only one segment of conceptions of citizenship, they lie at the core of those conceptions and therefore deserve special attention. The most original intention of the larger study is to examine the incentives of youth activism which has dominated the public discourse in recent years. Preliminary in-depth studies revealed a direct causal relationship between a strong communitarian conception of citizenship and the
political activism. Making-up interviews then focus exclusively on the young activists’ perception of citizenship rights, duties, and identities, and their own reasoning of the sources of these perceptions. The data from these making-up interviews then constitutes the major material of writing this chapter, which focuses on portraying the picture of citizenship that the youth activists understand. Aside from this thematic inquiry, this study also sheds some light on the process how the abstract self-understand is formed and finally transformed into real-life participation.

The rationale under this arrangement is a dynamic understanding of citizenship in which process and outcome stand in a dialectical relationship to each other. This is illustrated by looking at youth activism which can be understood as an expression of this approach to citizenship. The importance of political activism lies not only in what it achieves in terms of practical outcomes for increasingly disadvantaged social groups but also in the process of involving members of those groups in working for change and the impact this involvement can then have on these individuals’ capacity to act as citizens. It is important to emphasize the social nature of this process, defined by David Thomas as “the quality of relations between people, how decisions are made, conflicts aired, problems solved, people supported and cared for, values and standards defined, control and regulation enforced, and wisdom and traditions passed on” (1995).

Almond and Verba (1963) maintained that the specific contents of the citizens’ role are closely related to the structure of local and national political institutions and to the prevalent political culture. They define political culture as “the political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of its population. The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects among the members of the nation” (1963: 13). Following this approach the citizen role can be seen on the one hand as determined by the political culture, and on the other hand as one of its manifestations.

Almond and Verba see the political process in a democratic society as following two directions: “input” processes, which refer to the demands upon the system by the people; and “output” processes which refer to acts of legislation, policy making, and the like, which flow from the system. Distinguishing also between attention to purely political objects and attention to general and non-political objects, Almond and Verba classify three types of political cultures and three corresponding citizenship orientations. A particular political culture, which stresses “input” processes; a subject political culture, which stresses obedience to the “output” processes; and a parochial political culture which, unlike the former two, emphasizes attachment to nonpolitical objects and bodies. These three types of political cultures and their corresponding citizenship orientations usually exist side by side but receive different emphases in different societies, and among the various sub-groups within a particular society.
Based on the analysis of Almond and Verba, the dimensions of citizenship that were examined in the present study include, first, the extent to which the citizen’s role is viewed as specific and restricted to the political sphere, or as broader consisting of the whole of an individual’s obligations to his fellow men and to the society and the community in which one lives. Secondly, the extent to which the adolescents regard the citizen role as entailing primarily active participation and involvement in the political process, or as consisting chiefly upon passive affiliation, stressing obedience and loyalty.

Questions regarding the critical events that affect the informant’s way of defining the different social relations, the mutually reinforced dialectical process of the self-emancipation of citizenship awareness and the active participation into the community development or the broader democratic movement are asked. Interviews on the citizenship orientation of the youth activists reveal that they tend to describe the citizen’s role as diffuse and inclusive, and they attach great importance to active participation as being a “responsible and full citizen”. Other preliminary findings suggest that contemporary young people in Hong Kong are highly articulate about the political issues that affect their lives, as well as about the disconnection between these and mainstream politics. A sense of relative deprivation is generally detected from all the informants. One of the key premise of their political engagement is that they don’t feel that anyone in authority is listening to them and none of the formal channels of political communication, even the political parties, or civil society NGOs can articulate their interests properly and effectively.

The main line of inquiry concerns how the young activists think of themselves as citizens. Here, I assume that citizenship is a fundamental identity that helps to situate the individual in society. To put it in other words, the informants’ senses of self intricately link to their notions of what it means to be a citizen. Thus, I ask questions about how they think about the notion of ‘self’, and more specifically, how they think about the rights, duties, and identities attached to the self. In order to get the information, I talked in-depth with 12 core activists who are routinely involved in the new social movements since 2006. Here, by using the word “talk” rather than “interview”, I want to highlight the loosely controlled scenario of the one-to-one discussions: in order to discover the commonplace meanings of political terms, I try to make a circumstance as an ordinary daily chat between friends, discussing with the informants using the language and categories they actually use in their own thinking and conversations (Krueger 1988), rather than posing questions and ask them to react to them in a one-to-one situation. (The interviews were held in 2010-2011. They were relaxed, conversational, loosely structured.)

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3 The individual character of the discussion makes it possible for me to create such circumstance between the informants and myself, as the informants are all at the same age with me, and many are introduced by my own friends. This private personal ties, plus sometimes the same educational background, provide such a close and even intimate circumstamnt between me and the informants, thus help me to conduct the talk in a totally free atmosphere.
There are, of course, drawbacks to this kind of qualitative research. The 12 participants are not representative of any particular population, and thus the results are not generalizable in a statistical sense. Moreover, because of the homogeneity of the informants as young activists, and my substantive focus on citizenship, there may be some “social desirability effects”. Nonetheless, if we are to understand fully how the activists in a transitional society think about citizenship, we must begin by listening to how they talk about it and by analyzing their language. Only after we have allowed them to articulate their own views in their own words does it become meaningful to contemplate more quantitative methods of study. It is especially true in Hong Kong which lacks sufficient serious academic inference into the study of citizenship. Thus, this analysis may serve as a modest first step toward understanding how people, here, first starting from the activists, think about citizenship.

Promoting rights consciousness
T. H. Marshall (1977) has suggested a three-fold classification of the rights of citizenship: civil rights, political rights, and social rights. When the informants were asked to think about their own rights, they certainly did not devote equal attention to all the three types. The interesting finding is that they have shown a similar pattern of distinct emotion on the three types of rights. All of the four informants focused overwhelmingly on political rights: the right to vote a government of their own under a fully democratic political system. Spontaneous mentions of social rights were also acknowledgeable, but in most cases as the ramification of political rights. In contrast, the informants mentioned civil rights – the freedom of speech, the freedom of media, and the freedom of movement, far less frequently than political and social rights. Important groups among the populations of Hong Kong society have passed beyond the historical stages of fighting for the individual freedom. Today they are acting in pursuit of goals which no longer have a direct relationship to the imperatives of individual liberties. The local citizenry – drawn largely from the younger cohorts – have been socialized during an unprecedentedly period of the emerging political activism. For them, civil liberties may be taken for granted, as the freedom of speech, media and movement has already been a habitue life-style.

One of the most notable features of their response to the sequence of importance of the three types of rights is that they tend to place the highest priority on the right that is apparently absent and relatively more realistic to get in a near future through political movement, whilst place the lowest priority to the right that has already been guaranteed by both legal endowment and practical experience. In this respect, political right – the rights to vote for a democratic government through regular, competitive and meaningful elections, according to the responses of the young activists, is the most urgently needed. Social rights – the welfare rights in general, follows, and civil right – the “freedom” right mentioned the least. Political right is also perceived as the indispensable instrument to empower the public to bargain with and push the government to extend social rights and guarantee civil rights.
However, this “instrumental” feature of political right in the mind of these young activists, is by no means the same as the “utilitarian familism” (Lau 1981) as purported by former scholar to describe the Hongkongers before the 1980s. The theme of “utilitarian familism” is fundamentally individualist, as it purports that the individual Hongkonger positions the materialistic interests of his own family on the highest priority when structuring his relationships with other individuals, social groups and the whole society. This old spirit of Hong Kong people has definitely given way to the a new and communitarian version of citizenship as implied by the responses of the young activists whom I talked to.

The deep-seated element underlying the current understanding of citizenship rights is the consciousness of “community subjectivity” and a sense of altruism. Even several respondents raised great emphasis on the well-being of individual, they did this in a discursive setting of “I-Them” format; that is, they perceive themselves as the representatives of the disadvantaged social groups in the community, and as the agents articulating interests of these less-educated, powerless poor people in this business-dominated territory. In many cases, these young men had never met with the target group before they took move to help them. Oftentimes, they filter through contested events concerning the conflicts between the business-dominated government and the grassroots disadvantages, for one that they think is the most extreme case of social injustice and business hegemony. They then take spontaneous actions, both on-line mobilization and on-site protests, to help the “deprived” social group to voice their grievance and bargaining with the government through persistent protests. Thus, their target group and their movement arena is in flux and to some extent provisional. In spite of this, the focal point guiding their case selection is consistent; there is a vaguely defined concept of “marginalized social class” in their mind. They are aiming at helping out those inferior grassroots social groups who are victims of the current un-democratic and business-dominated political system, and trying to make changes to the status quo. In doing this, they have gone beyond the pursuit of their own personal interests. Most of them choose to live as a free-lancer and have taken protests as an occupation. Different from the elucidation that these young activists are inclined toward self-expressive and post-materialist values (Ma 2011: 60), the interviews with the young activists reveal a paradoxical finding, that although they manifest a “post-materialist” mentality, emphasizing personal autonomy and identity against any kind of centralized authority, they are using the means of new social movement to get to the ends of the old-fashioned “materialist” needs – the issues of economic distribution and legal protection of social status such as citizenship rights and economic democracy. Only that the materialist needs that they are claiming are those belong to the marginalized social groups, not to themselves. Considering that the configuration of “materialist/industrial society” and “post-

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4 The mode of action these young activists are taking is similar to that of new social movement which Claus Offe (1980) has given a substantial summary. The internal mode of action – the way individuals acting together in order to constitute a collectivity, is highly informal, ad hoc, discontinuous, context-sensitive, and egalitarian. The external mode of action – the way the movement actors confronting the external world and their political opponents, is oftentimes physical presence of (large number of) people, unfavoring conventional political negotiation as in most cases they have nothing to exchange with the authority.
materialist/post-industrial society” are respectively corresponding to the notion of conventional social movement and the new social movement, what we can see from these young activists is a complex mixture of a “post-materialistic” mentality, activated in the form of new social movement, whilst aiming at some materialistic claims that mostly appeared in the industrial era in the western democracies.

What accounts for these apparent differences in the understanding of different types of rights of these youth activists? In general, our understanding of political concepts is shaped by politics itself (and vice versa) (Farr, 1989). Thus, the understanding citizens have of a political concept such as rights reflects the particular historical context in which they are situated. Following this reasoning, two complementary explanations seem plausible. On the one hand, similar to the scarcity hypothesis of Inglehart (1971) when he was illustrating his theory on intergenerational value change, the findings seem to favor such an interpretation that individuals will give maximum attention to the things they sense to be the most important unsatisfied needs at a given time. In the context of this study, the hierarchical order of the most important but unsatisfied needs seems to lie in this sequence, that the social rights going in first, followed by the political rights, while the civil rights constitute the lowest priority.

This interpretation maybe different from the mainstream understanding of rights priority in Hong Kong, when most local commentaries have concentrated overwhelmingly on the lack and urgent need of a full range of political rights enabling the individuals to participate extensively and effectively “in the exercise of political power as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body” (Marshall 1949: 71-72). The conversations of the activists show that the most direct incentives of their participation is oftentimes the materialistic deprivation or economic hardship of certain marginalized social group or social community. The mentioned most frequently the rights that are necessary for the preservation of the ordinary citizens’ basic standard of living and for protecting them from economic misfortune. The instant subsequent concern then goes to the absence of full political rights, when the undemocratic and business-hijacked political system finally becomes the major target to blame for causing the individual misfortune. In this respect, as both political right and social right are desired by Hong Kong people, the latter one is generated directly from the life experiences of the Hongkongers, thus jumping to the uppermost on their mental agenda.

The understandings that underpin these young activists’ emphasis on social rights suggest that it would be simplistic to identify social rights, as might easily be done, with a communitarian conception of citizenship. The communitarian arguments frequently adopted by social and political theorists (e.g., Goodin 1985) in defense of social rights, such as the protection of the vulnerable, the unpredictability of misfortune, the strong helping the weak, found echoes well in the thinking of these young activists. Furthermore, when discussing the historical and evolutionary account of the origin of rights, most of the respondents gave the view that rights were not merely bestowed by law, or given by government but extracted piecemeal from government by the
ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, there is this persistent recognition within these activists that rights had to be fought for, and rights are gradually accumulated over years or even centuries in the course of popular campaigns and struggles. This interpretation leads to an understanding of rights as alienable and contextual in origin.

On the other hand, this original “social-political-civil” sequence of rights priority is constructed strategically by the young activists into a new sequence when the political rights go to the top of the agenda, and the social rights descending to the second most important and most needed. To do this, they attribute the spoil of social rights to the absence of full political rights. The typical logic is that, to sacrifice the social rights of the most vulnerable group is the most-frequently used strategy of this business-dominated government to cater for the interests of the business giants in the territory. The bureaucratic inertia and the illegitimacy nature of the local government frustrated the endeavors of small-scaled and un-continuous struggles from different separated communities or groups. The most feasible breakthrough of this deadlock, as iterated by the informants, is to merge these community-based movements to the democracy movement in the whole territory. By electing the government through periodic and meaningful elections, the most ordinary and most disadvantaged citizens are able to have a say to define their own social rights, although in a minimalist sense. Following this reasoning, the activists reconstruct the discourse when defending the interests for certain small communities, linking the misfortune of a small sector to the shared grievance of the larger society to gain more public attention and social sympathy, and meanwhile to mobilize more resources and resource. As the focal point of the social grievance has been settled on the local government’s legitimacy crisis and the democracy movement has staged from a boom to a boost, these young men then strategically frame political rights as the principle movement goal instead of social rights. This strategy stems from two related considerations. First, as forcefully explained by the activists, the substance of social rights is multifaceted and group-specific. That is, members from different social groups or residential communities may have distinct interpretations to the meaning of social rights, based on their own life experiences. In contrast, the understanding of political right – the right to elect the government through free, fair and competitive elections – is more consistent across different social groups and communities, and more likely to reach the public agenda. Second, the acquisition of full political right is a necessary condition to ensure social rights. Moreover, the democracy movement of the whole territory is already underway. Thus, to adjust the struggle for social rights into the process of territory-wide democracy movement becomes the most efficient strategy of these young activists.

In summary, my interviews with these young activists reveal that when they think about rights, they most naturally think about social and political rights, and mentioned relatively less of civil rights. Underlying this common focus is a Communitarian understanding of the nature of rights, accompanied by a sense that these rights are gradually accumulated in the course of popular campaigns and struggles. The understandings that underpin these active youth’s emphasis on political and social rights suggest that it would be simplistic to
identify their notion of rights, as might easily be done, with a communitarian conception of citizenship. The communitarian arguments frequently adopted by social and political theorists (e.g., Goodin 1985) in defense of social rights – the protection of the vulnerable, the unpredictability of misfortune, the strong helping the weak – found echoes in the thinking of the informants. For the youth activists I talked to, when asked about their understanding of the rights of a citizen, they think about the rights that are necessary for the preservation of everybody’s basic standard of living and for protecting people from economic misfortune.

Moreover, the respondents also offered relatively sophisticated accounts of the origins of rights, accounts that have a strikingly mixed features of both liberal and communitarian flavor to them. They are liberal in the sense while saying their rights as “inalienable”, they emphasis frequently on government’s responsibility to endow legally and guarantee politically the basic rights to all the citizens. In the meanwhile, they also clearly suggested a somehow contradicted view that rights had to be fought for. This could be interpreted in this way that the government’ incapacity to provide and ensure the basic rights claimed by the public finally pushes the public to organize voluntary movement to struggle for these rights. Thus, in the language of citizenship rights, the politics of citizenship formation is also a developmental history of the extending and exercising of different forms of citizenship rights.

Finally, the emphasis given by the respondents to political and social rights also suggested an understanding that reflects the evolutionary development of these rights in Hong Kong. Two themes ran through their thinking. First, rights were neither legal guarantees nor moral claims, but instead of a complex reflections of historical context that the individuals encounter. The rights they emphasize most are exactly those they have been deprived of and desire for. That’s why they have offered relatively sophisticated accounts of the importance of social and political rights, rather than civil rights. Moreover, as these young people are themselves involved in the process of mass movement for more social and political rights, they are inclined to attach their movement experience to their conceptions of citizenship rights, and making strategic adjustment over the public discourse on the priority sequence of different types of citizenship rights. This is suggested by the language they use to discuss rights as well as the actual meanings associated with the concept. In most cases, the intention to defend and extend social rights for certain deprived community brought them into the course of political participation in the first place. However, during their later practice of community-based campaign, they gradually merged the small-scaled protest for concrete social rights into the territory-wide democracy movement for the political rights of the whole citizenry, to maximum their effort for a most-likely achieved goal.

Promoting a sense of belonging
The politics of identity is at the center theme of the understanding of citizenship. Indeed, how the Hongkongers think of themselves is central to understanding how they think about rights. Their rights schemata are
incorporated into their self-schemata, or identities, as Hongkongers. From the perspective of the individual, what it means for “an abstract person” to have rights becomes what it means for “me” to have rights. Thus, following the understanding of citizenship rights, this study then asks the young people how they think of themselves as citizens in Hong Kong.

Local commentators have already noted the emergence of a new Hong Kong ethnic identity vis-a-vis a Chinese national identity. In Lee’s (1995:125) survey in 1990, more than half (56.6 percent) of the respondents regarded themselves as “Hongkongers,” only 25 percent as “Chinese”. This indigenous identity, however, is a relatively new concept that emerged in accordance with the political development of Hong Kong since the 1980s. The political scenario began to change in the last decade and a half. With the signing of a Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, it was decided that Hong Kong would be returned to China in July 1997. The signing of the Joint Declaration brought Hong Kong into a period of decolonization, or as some would prefer to call it, a period of colonial transition (Bray and Lee, 1993). This significant agreement between the two governments took place 13 years before the actual handover of sovereignty. This provided a long period of preparation to precede the transfer.

The years of colonial transition witnessed obvious changes in the territory’s political scenario. At the beginning of this period of colonial transition, the situation was still characterized by political quiescence. To most people, 1997 was still too far away to have a tangible impact on life. Hong Kong continued to be operated as a British colony, and society continued to operate in a depoliticized manner, although some preparation for the change in sovereignty began to take place, such as changes in the school curriculum. However, Hong Kong’s political climate changed notably at the turn of the 1990s, with the introduction of direct election of part of seats in the legislative branch. Among the others, the June 4 Incident in 1989 is definitely one of the most significant. The incident caused concern among Hong Kong’s people about their political future after the handover. It aroused political interest and raised aspirations for a democratic society (Lau and Louie, 1993: viii).

In fact, as early as the years after World War II, Hong Kong has been experiencing the gradual shedding of a refugee mentality, the acquisition of a sense of commitment to the territory, and the emergence of a “Hong Kong” ethnic identity. Yet the “Hongkonger” identity asserted against a taken-for-granted “Chinese” identity. Lee’s survey showed that a tiny portion of the Hong Kong respondent (less than 10 percent) neither trusted the Beijing government nor were prepared to regard “political allegiance with the PRC” as a necessary criterion for defining “Chinese-ness.” Tam’s (1996: 9) survey in 1994 also reports that 90 percent of the interviewees felt negatively about the Beijing government, particularly on its supposed lack of rules on law and freedom.
The search of the sources of this local Hong Kong identity has also proliferated in local scholarship community. Some scholars have located popular culture as an important site for nourishing and articulating a local consciousness (Ma Kit Wai, 1996; Ng Chun Hung, 1998). Some attribute the emergence of a sense of local belonging to demographic changes and social policy changes (Lui Tai Lok, 1997; T. Wong, 1998). Postcolonial critics trace the development of Hong Kong subjectivity by looking at the historical articulation of nationalism, liberalism, and colonialism against the background of the cold war (Ip Iam Chong, 1997). Others attribute it to the colonial state’s conscious efforts at community building through civic and ideological engineering in the aftermath of the mass riots in 1966 and 1967 (Turner, 1995).

Interviews with the young activists reveal two supplementary findings apart from the extant studies. The first finding embarks on a new effect of the already-iterated “China factor” on the formation of the Hong Kong identity. The “China factor” has been interpreted by previous studies as Hong Kong people’s apprehension of China’s anti-democratic intentions and its excessive intervention of the local affairs thus deteriorating the Hong Kong’s political autonomy. The China sentiment reached a historical high in the aftermath of the 1989 incidence, and the shadow of this incident has been lasting ever since its happening and becoming the most significant political cleavage in the course of contemporary political development in Hong Kong. The interviews, however, reveal another aspect of the “China factor” in apart from the iterated rhetoric of anti-autocracy comprehension. This new element is another form of anxiety, the anxiety on the disappearing of the Hong Kong miracle and a shrinking of Hong Kong advantage in the course of the formation of a mainland giant.

When the sovereignty of Hong Kong reverted to China in 1997, Hong Kong, while politically subordinate, was in many other crucial respects not in a dependent subaltern position but was in fact more advanced than China, in terms of economic prosperity, civilization, access to the international networks and so forth. Thus, at that period, there was a sense of superiority of the local Hongkongers over their mainland counterparts. However, after years of “integration”, Hong Kong finds itself being gradually assimilated into the Mainland system. Economically, Hong Kong is increasingly integrated with the Pearl Delta River region, notably through a Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) and the “Framework Agreement on Hong Kong/Guangdong Cooperation” signed by the two sides on April 2010 as the newest regional cooperation projects. Politically, the imprint of Beijing has been evident in a number of post-handover decisions. As Holliday et al. (2004) argue, the initial insulation of the HKSAR from the mainland system actually deprives Hong Kong of the leverage to defend local interests in the central-local bargaining framework of the People’s Republic of China. The enhanced economic integration between Hong Kong and the mainland in recent years,

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5 Studies on electoral politics in Hong Kong have accommodated the anti-China sentiment into their survey of electoral behavior in the territory and found it a most significant predictor for partisan identification and voting behavior. Li (1995) advances a more sophisticated argument that asserts the pro/anti-China factor (in his words: the centre-periphery) as one of the two major political cleavages dominating the emerging political market in Hong Kong.
coupled with the lack of democratic government in Hong Kong, makes the SAR more dependent on political and economic support from Beijing, damaging the autonomy prospects of Hong Kong.

The disappearing Hong Kong superiority over the mainland has caused a psychological panic in the Hongkongers, especially in those young people who are now in their 20s and have experienced the economic downturn and the frustrated democratization in Hong Kong in their early socialization from adolescent to adulthood. On the one hand, the central government’s intervention in course of democratization in Hong Kong caused them great apprehension of the political autonomy and democratization of Hong Kong. On the other hand, as noted by Liu (2007), these young people belong to the generation who have enjoyed far less than their precedent generations the economic fruitiness of Hong Kong, and instead, experienced the whole process of shrinking job market and the diminishing up-mobility opportunities, as caused by the industrial transformation of the local economy and the global financial crises. The former formula of the “hongkong spirit” – that is, to move upward along the ladder of social strata through diligent working has collapsed in the face of limited job opportunities and unaffordable life expenses. Yet, the government, speaking in the tone of the giant business groups, has shown no intention to change the status quo. Economic deprivation and political inefficacy, together with the persistent apprehension of the Chinese communist sharpened the sense of a local collective identity, this time however, towards a negatively-termed direction that clearly shows the inferior position of a hongkong identity vis-a-vis a powerful mainland and an undemocratic business-dominated government. The previous configuration of “superior Hong Kong/inferior mainland” has transformed into the new form of “vulnerable Hong Kong/powerful mainland”. At the ends of this new formulation are at one side a vaguely defined hongkong citizenry who perceive themselves as experiencing economic misfortune and facing the difficulties to fulfill even the most basic standard of living, and at the other side an undemocratic political system which lacks any regular and institutionalized mechanism for ensuring governmental responsiveness accompanied by a extremely unequal society dominated by the real estate property hegemony. In this respect, the reference point of a hongkong identity has, in fact, been transformed from the autocratic Chinese communist regime to a cluster of undemocratic, unresponsive and business-dominated authority. The cluster of authority, as couched by the discussants in accordance, albeit vaguely, positions in opposing with the ordinary hongkong citizenry, ranging from the local and central government, to the business empire which has been “hijacking” the political development in Hong Kong. Thus, in their understanding of the citizenship identity, our young activists have incorporated both the undemocratic local government and the business hegemony into the former schemata in which only the “China factor” appears crucial.

Citizenship as participation and some concluding remarks

The instant influence of the Hongkongers’ rights consciousness and the new formulation of the local identity is demonstrated by their active participation in community development and territory-wide democracy movement. In the broader sense, citizenship defines rights and obligations of membership vis-a-vis the community and
other citizens. It entails individual rights and access, which are significant for equality, participation and social cohesion. A citizen is one who is able to share rights and responsibilities, and to identify with a community with everyone else. In this respect, citizenship perception has an inherent role in defining individual’s political behavior. As Macpherson (1977: 6) argues, “those beliefs ... determine the limits and possible development of the system: they determine what people will put up with, and what they will demand.” Most people are involved in the political sphere in ways consistent with their citizenship perspective.

As alluded above, the young people that I talked to tend to give a communitarian perspective of the meaning of citizenship, which stresses the process of citizenship formation through social mobilization to establish the rights, participation, and a sense of belonging to a community. There are plenty of hints from their words that their awareness of citizenship rights, access and identity leads directly to specific forms of its realization. As far as these citizens are concerned, notwithstanding the strong appeals of social citizenship to them, they strategically develop a pathway around to the realization of social rights by putting ahead the pursuit of the universal ideals of political rights in the course of social mobilization. By doing this, they manage to incorporate the protests of different small-scaled disadvantaged groups into the mainstream democracy movement in the whole community.

Another element of citizenship, the sense of belonging, is also found to be crucial to young people’s participation and the specific form they apply to participate. The sense of belonging, or put it in another way, the citizenship identity, can be regarded as a function of the interplay between rights and participation. To the extent that citizenship implies a membership in a community, a sense of belonging emerges and evolves through social practices within a community. Full citizenship means that citizens enjoy not only the rights but also opportunities of full participation within a community. Nevertheless, in practice the citizenship rights and access are often denied due to the problem of exclusion, and the participation in the policy-making process for more rights and access is oftentimes barred by an undemocratic and unresponsive political system. Most of my informants admit that it was their self-understanding and their increasing emotional attachment to Hong Kong that promoted, at the first place, their participation in community development. Indeed, most of this new generation of social movement activists are coming from the protests towards the government’s urban renewal projects, most notably, when they were protecting the Lee Tung Street, the Queen’s Ferry and the Star Ferry in the years 2006 and 2007. They joint together to assist the residents on the traditional Lee Tung Street in 2006 to fight for the demolition of the street and later campaigned against government’s policies on environmental and heritage protection issues. These participation, in turn, boost individual and collective self-confidence, as they come to see themselves as political actors and effective citizens. This is particularly true for this generation of young activists, for whom involvement in community development can be more personally fruitful than engagement in formal politics which they think is more alienating than empowering.
The newly identified element in these young people’s schemata of citizenship identity, the anti-local government and anti-business hegemony sentiment, differentiates their way of participation with the activists of the older generation. The previous generation of young activists, those who have participated in their twenties in the 1980s and 1990s, were engaged through conventional channels of participation, mostly via forming political parties and formal civil society organizations. As noted by one of the older activists, their participation in the formal, institutionalized channel was encouraged by the colonial government’s initiative, albeit limited, to starting political reform with incremental progress in laying the foundations of elected representative government. Electoral reform by the eve of Hong Kong’s reunification produced the main impetus for political change in the advocates that were “mostly young, out-spoken and uninhibited in their enthusiasm for Western concepts of popular authority and accountable government” (Pepper, 2000: 421). One of the key figures in the most articulate advocates, the lawyer Martin Lee’s surprising victory over a favored conservative opponent contesting the legal constituency seat in the 1985 Legislative Council election reinforced the young advocates’ enthusiasm and anticipation for a faster pace of democratization. As hinted by Lee himself, popularly elected government would provide the best safeguard against the possible future excesses of Chinese rule. Many young advocates for political change then facilitated the newly released political opportunity of direct election by organizing political parties or other forms of political groups to contest for the directly-elected seats in the Legislative Council. The major theme underlying their political enthusiasm was the confidence that by occupying the Legislative Council, they were able to accelerate the pace of democratization in Hong Kong and finally achieve the “ultimate aim” of universal suffrage for electing both the chief executive and all Legislative Council members which was guaranteed by the Basic Law (article 45 and 68). Thus, the rationale underpinning the mode of participation of those young activists in the older generation is the political enthusiasm for more democratic reform, the confidence in the function of the newly introduced partial democratic mechanics, and the optimism about the prospect of the advent of a fully-democratic political system.

Unfortunately, after almost three decades of democratization, the progressive political development as anticipated by the young activists in the 1980s and 1990s has not come along, whilst in stead, a scenario of political stagnation prevails. The Legislative Council still has little power to initiate or enact legislation. The “executive-dominate” governance essence remains, with the non-democratically elected chief executive effectively immune from LegCo. The pro-democracy political parties are still largely impotent, and are further divided and fragmented. China’s fear of a full democracy in Hong Kong and its intervention to slow down the pace of democratization has proved to be apparent by the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. And finally, the ordinary citizens, while still lacking any regular and institutionalized mechanism for ensuring governmental...
responsiveness, are experiencing a new form of relative deprivation, confronting the extremely unequal society and the business hegemony. The sense of grievance echoes loud and clear in the group of youngsters who are fed with advanced education but lack enough access to the upper level of social strata. Faced with “the disconnection between political participation, political representation and political power” (Baum, 2000: 439), the ordinary citizens are increasingly disappointed with the malfunction of the conventional channels of political communication, such as the political parties and various civil society organization, thus lacking enough motivation to participate through these conventional channels.

The political stagnation, however, has encouraged the participation of the young people who are experiencing the same sense of deprivation with other most disadvantaged grassroots citizens. In his analysis of the policy impasse in after-handover Hong Kong government, Leung (2007) purports that new institutional tensions and cleavages have emerged as a result of the paradox of the escalating demands for participation from new players and the unchanging policy architecture that failed to “channel a more orderly process of policy participation and agreement building” (2007: 53). Compared with their precedent counterpart, the major impetus of their participation is a sense of deprivation, rather than a sense of political efficacy; it is the despair about the existing political organs and system, rather than the confidence and the optimists on the function of the major democratic mechanics. These impetuses operate through these young people’s realization of social and political citizenship, intermediated by their conceptualizations of the political system and their role within that system, and finally facilitates their understanding of how to interact with political leaders and institutions. Accordingly, there is a strong sentiment of “self-reliance” among these young activists. However, the meaning of “self” does not refer to a specific individual citizen, but refer to a vaguely defined social group who share the same feeling of grievance and deprivation, and the same irritation towards illegitimate authority. In accordance with this sentiment, these young people only promote and participate in direct actions, drawing clear boundaries with formal channels of participation that are operated in organizational form, like the political parties, and other civil society organization. They are particularly attentive towards the dynamic issues of in the local political arena, “search for” disadvantaged groups and frame the public discourse accordingly to attract the sympathy from other citizens.

It is apparent that in accordance with the relationship between citizenship perspective and individual political behavior, the comprehension of citizenship also affects citizens’ conceptualizations of the political system and their role within that system, which further facilitates our understanding of how they interact with political leaders and institutions, and therefore, in part, how the system itself works. In this respect, citizenship perspectives can be seen as the prediction of deciding whether to participate or not, and deciding the specific mode of participation. Responses of the young people also indicate that their understanding of the self, the community, and the political system is not a static stereotype, but a dynamic process which is influenced by their experience from the practice of political participation. Thus, in their words, citizenship is both a result
and an incentive for political activism. The relationship between citizenship perspective and the political activism is dialectic and mutually reinforcing.

References


界定公民身份
——香港“80 后”青年行动者如何理解公民权利、义务及身份

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摘 要：有关公民身份的现有研究多从纯学理角度界定公民身份这一概念，鲜有研究从经验角度探究公民本人如何理解其公民身份以及与此相关的公民权利及义务。本文以香港“反高铁”运动中的“80 后”青年行动者为经验对象，对公民身份的经验研究进行初步尝试。通过参与式观察与深入访谈，笔者发现香港“80 后”青年行动者对公民身份的理解具备显著的“社群主义”倾向，有别于过去人们对港人“自由主义”至上的普遍印象。港“80 后”青年行动者的社群主义公民身份特质主要体现在以下几个方面：1) 具备强烈的权利意识，且在社会运动过程中自觉地将公民的社会权、政治权置于公民权之上；2) 有别于港人政治冷漠的传统形象，“80 后”青年行动者表现出强烈的参与欲望与积极的参与行为，他们并将政治参与看作公民所必须履行之义务；3) 拥有清晰的本土身份观，这种情感归属成为他们积极参与政治的内在动因之一。

关键词：社群主义公民身份、自由主义公民身份、“80 后”青年行动者、香港

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