意义理论可以采取塔尔斯基式真理理论的形式？
作者：薛平
关键字：意义理论经验信念的内容确定基础范畴信念经验条件的内容确定条件范畴性条件语句陈说的工作条件语句陈说的以言取效条件语句的组合性
摘要/Abstract
本文旨在论证，戴维森式意义理论不能采取塔尔斯基式真理理论的形式。其主要论可以陈述如下：设L是一个自然语言，S是L一个任意语句，U是S的一个任意陈说（utterance）。考虑到S由其各个组成成分组成这一事实，人们可以提出这样一个问题：U的真值条件的确定如何依赖于S的各个组成成分对这一确定的贡献？戴维森式意义理论是解答这个问题的理论。戴维森关于戴维森式意义理论可以采取塔尔斯基式真理理论的形式的主张有两个错误：第一，它未能认识到，塔尔斯基式真理理论本身有严重缺陷；第二，它实质上包含两个主张：其中之一是，戴维森式意义理论可以从L中所有语义原始项的含义说明（the sense-accounts of all semantic primitives of L）导出，另一个则是，不论关于L的使用者掌握任何可能的L中语义原始项含义的可能性基础的说明是否已被构造出来，仅凭L中所有现有的语义原始项的含义说明就足以构造出关于L中所有可能的语义原始项的含义说明；然而后一个主张是没有根据的。
A theory of meaning in Davidson’s sense is an answer to the question, ‘How does the determination of the truth-condition of an utterance of a sentence S of a natural language L depend upon the contribution of S’s components to it?’ Davidson claims that such a theory can take the form of a Tarski-style theory of truth, which the paper intends to reject. My theses are, first, Davidson’s claim ignores that Tarski’s theory has serious defections; second, it comprises the claim that the sense-account of any possible semantic primitive of L can be constructed on the basis the sense-accounts of all present semantic primitives of L provide, which is wrong (Roughly, the sense-account of a semantic primitive Q of L is an account of any token of Q’s contribution to determining the truth-condition of an utterance of an L’s sentence of which it is a component).
